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THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY’S MISGUIDED QUEST
TO UNDERMINE THE
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.*
I.

Introduction

The preamble to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)1 affirms that one of the
statute’s primary purposes is “to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices.”2 When President Obama signed DoddFrank into law, he declared that the statute would create “the
strongest consumer financial protections in history.”3
In order to implement and enforce Dodd-Frank’s new
protections for consumers, Congress created the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (“CFPB") as an “independent bureau” within the

*Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School,
Washington, DC. I wish to thank the Law School and Dean Paul Schiff
Berman for a summer research grant that supported my work on this article.
I am grateful to Dick Pierce and Heidi Schooner for helpful comments on a
preliminary draft of this paper. I am also indebted to Germaine Leahy, Head
of Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Library, and Sarah Trumble, a
member of our Class of 2013, for excellent research assistance. Unless
otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through December
16, 2011.
On January 4, 2012, after the manuscript for this article was completed,
President Obama issued a recess appointment to install Richard Cordray as
the first Director of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. David
Nakamura & Felicia Sonmez, Obama defies Senate, puts Cordray in
consumer post, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012, at A01. As discussed infra in
note 13, Republican members of Congress and some analysts have
challenged the validity of Mr. Cordray’s appointment. Discussion of that
issue is beyond the scope of this article.
1
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
2
Preamble to Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, at 1376.
3
President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signingdodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act
[hereinafter
Presidential Dodd-Frank Statement].
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Federal Reserve System (“Fed”).4 President Obama explained that
CFPB will operate as “a new consumer watchdog with just one job:
looking out for people—not big banks, not lenders, not investment
houses—looking out for people as they interact with the financial
system.”5 Similarly, the Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank
explained that CFPB’s mission is to “help protect consumers from
unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts that so often trap them in
unaffordable financial products.”6
Thus, Congress gave CFPB “the Herculean task of regulating
the financial services industry to protect consumers.”7 Congress
sought to increase CFPB’s “accountability” for that mission by
delegating to CFPB the combined authority of seven federal agencies
that were previously responsible for protecting consumers of
financial services.8
Congress determined that a single federal authority dedicated
to protecting consumers of financial services was needed in light of
“the spectacular failure of the [federal] prudential regulators to
protect average American homeowners from risky, unaffordable”
mortgages during the housing boom that led to the current financial
crisis.9 As stated in the Senate report, federal banking agencies
“routinely sacrificed consumer protection” while adopting policies
that promoted the “short-term profitability” of large banks, nonbank
mortgage lenders and Wall Street securities firms.10 The Senate
4

Dodd-Frank § 1011(a); see also H.R. REP. NO.111-517, at 874 (2010)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730 (“Title X establishes
the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (Bureau), which will be an
independent bureau within the Federal Reserve System.”).
5
Presidential Dodd-Frank Statement, supra note 3.
6
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010).
7
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010).
8
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010).
9
Id. at 15; see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730 (“The Bureau will have the
authority and accountability to ensure that existing consumer protection
laws and regulations are comprehensive, fair, and vigorously enforced.”).
10
Senate Report No. 111-176, at 15-16 (2010) (quoting congressional
testimony of Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009). For additional analysis of
failures by federal bank regulators to protect consumers during the housing
boom that led to the financial crisis, see, e.g., KATHLEEN ENGEL & PATRICIA
A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 157-205 (2011); SIMON JOHNSON &
JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
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report concluded that “it was the failure by the [federal] prudential
regulators to give sufficient consideration to consumer protection that
helped bring the financial system down.”11
As explained in Part II of this paper, the financial services
industry and most Republican members of Congress vigorously
opposed the creation of CFPB. During the debates on Dodd-Frank,
industry trade groups and Republican legislators argued that CFPB
was likely to impose burdensome regulations that would reduce the
availability of credit to consumers. CPFB’s opponents also
maintained that the consumer protection function should remain with
federal banking agencies in order to prevent consumer safeguards
from undermining the safety and soundness of financial institutions.
Opponents further charged that CFPB would have unprecedented
freedom to operate without meaningful checks and balances.
Accordingly, they alleged, CFPB would likely become an allpowerful bureaucracy that would stifle innovation and flexibility in
consumer financial services.12
Republicans failed to stop Congress from authorizing the
creation of CFPB in Title X of Dodd-Frank. However, following
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 120-32, 141-44 (2010) (“The Federal Reserve
sidestepped its consumer protection responsibilities by claiming it lacked
jurisdiction. . . . While the Federal Reserve was neglecting to protect
consumers, other regulatory agencies were neglecting to ensure the
soundness of the banks they supervised,” id. at 142, 143); Oren Bar-Gill &
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 81-95 (2008)
(“The problem is deep and systemic. These agencies are designed with a
primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system.
This means protecting banks' profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a
lesser priority,” id. at 90); Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation:
Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 143, 151-69
(2009) (“The events of the past year have laid bare the shortcomings of our
current system of financial-institution regulation. These shortcomings have
played out on two levels: consumer protection and systemic risk,” id. at
151); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State
Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. Corp. L. 893,
897-919 (2011) (“Federal regulatory inaction and federal preemption
encouraged federally-chartered depository institutions and their affiliates to
become leading participants in nonprime mortgage lending. Ultimately, the
regulatory failures of the FRB, the OCC, and the OTS contributed to
defaults and foreclosures on millions of nonprime loans,” id. at 898).
11
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010).
12
Melissa B. Jacoby, Dodd-Frank, Regulatory Innovation, and the Safety of
Consumer Financial Products, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 99, 100 (2011).
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Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the financial services industry and
Republican legislators launched a new campaign to weaken CFPB’s
autonomy and authority. The financial sector gave strong backing to
Republican candidates in the 2010 congressional elections. That
support helped Republicans to secure control of the House and
capture several additional Senate seats.
Shortly after the new Congress convened in January 2011,
Republican leaders in the House introduced legislation that would
transform CFPB’s governance, powers and funding. The House
Republican bills proposed (i) to create a five-member bipartisan
commission to govern CFPB in place of a single Director, (ii) to
grant federal banking agencies an expanded veto power over CFPB’s
regulations, and (iii) to give Congress complete control over CFPB’s
budget. At the same time, forty-four Republican Senators declared
that they would block confirmation of any Director of CFPB until the
President and Democratic leaders in Congress agreed to make the
same three changes to CFPB’s operations. Republicans again argued
that CFPB would be a menacing superagency without meaningful
oversight unless the stipulated changes were made. By preventing
confirmation of any Director, Republicans significantly limited
CFPB’s ability to implement its mandate under Dodd-Frank.13
13

On January 4, 2012, President Obama invoked his constitutional power of
recess appointment and appointed Richard Cordray as CFPB’s first
Director. Helene Cooper & Jennifer Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama
Appoints Consumer Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2012, at A1; Laura Litvan &
Kathleen Hunter, Cordray Appointment Signals Obama’s Readiness to
Campaign
Against
Congress,
BLOOMBERG,
Jan.
5,
2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-05/obama-s-naming-of-cordraysignals-readiness-for-brawling-election-campaign.html.
Republican
members of Congress and some analysts challenged the validity of Mr.
Cordray’s appointment. They maintained that the Senate was not in recess
when President Obama issued the appointment. They pointed to the
Senate’s scheduling of brief pro forma sessions that were explicitly
designed to prevent President Obama from making recess appointments.
The Obama Administration released an opinion of the Justice Department
declaring that the Senate’s pro forma sessions did not prevent the President
from determining that (i) the Senate was unavailable to act as a body in
performing its advise-and-consent function on Presidential appointments
and was therefore in recess and (ii) in those circumstances the President
could exercise his constitutional authority to make recess appointments.
Cheryl Bolen, Appointments and Nominations: Justice Department Releases
Opinion Finding Recess Appointments Lawful, 98 BNA’S BANKING REPORT
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Contrary to the claims advanced by CFPB’s opponents, Part
III of this paper shows that CFPB’s governance, powers and funding
are similar to those of other federal financial regulators. CFPB’s
single-Director model of leadership is similar to the governance
structure for the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)
and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”). CFPB’s
regulatory and enforcement powers are comparable to those
exercised by OCC, FHFA, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Federal Reserve Board (“FRB”).
CFPB’s ability to fund its operations without relying on
congressional appropriations is, again, comparable to OCC, FHFA,
FDIC and FRB. The financial services industry and its legislative
allies have strenuously defended the governance structure, authority
and independence of OCC and FHFA. Accordingly, it appears that
CFPB’s opponents are motivated by their opposition to CFPB’s
consumer protection mission rather than the bureau’s structure.
As explained in Part IV, the three changes in CFPB’s
structure demanded by Republicans would significantly undermine
CFPB’s autonomy and its ability to fulfill its statutory mandate.
Replacing CFPB’s Director with a multimember commission would
increase the likelihood of infighting and deadlock within CFPB’s
leadership. Allowing federal financial regulators to veto CFPB’s
regulations by majority vote on general “safety and soundness”
grounds would make it very difficult for CFPB to adopt rules that
might reduce the short-term profitability of financial institutions.
Requiring CFPB to depend on congressional appropriations for its
budget would greatly increase the risk that CFPB would be captured
or neutralized by the financial services industry. Financial
institutions and their trade associations have used the appropriations
process to slash the budgets of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”), thereby impairing the ability of both agencies
to fulfill their statutory agendas prescribed by Dodd-Frank. In
combination, the three changes advocated by Republicans would
seriously weaken CFPB’s ability to protect consumers. Contrary to
the claims of the financial services industry, any weakening of CFPB
95 (Jan. 17, 2012); Cheryl Bolen, Appointments and Nominations: White
House Asserts Legal Rationale for Presidential Recess Appointments, 98
BNA’S BANKING REPORT 99 (Jan. 17, 2012). Analysis of the validity of Mr.
Cordray’s recess appointment as CFPB Director is beyond the scope of this
article.
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would likely have deleterious effects not only on consumers, but also
on the long-term soundness and stability of our financial system.
II.

The Financial Services Industry and Its Congressional
Allies Strongly Opposed CFPB’s Creation and Have
Sought to Undermine Its Autonomy and Authority
A.

The Industry’s Efforts
Establishment of CFPB

to

Prevent

the

During 2009 and 2010, financial industry trade groups—
including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers
Association—waged an aggressive campaign to defeat the Obama
Administration’s proposal to establish an independent consumer
financial protection agency.14 From the beginning of the debates over
Dodd-Frank, industry associations and their members gave “top
priority [to] killing President Obama’s proposal,”15 because they
viewed CFPB as an “unneeded, intrusive new agency that would
increase the[ir] cost of doing business.”16 The financial services
industry urged Congress to leave the responsibility for protecting
14

Jacoby, supra note 12, at 99 (describing the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce’s campaign against the creation of a consumer financial
protection agency); see also, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser, The CFPA: How a
crusade to protect consumers lost its steam, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at
G01 (reporting that “[b]usiness groups – most vociferously the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce and the American Bankers Association – have
campaigned fiercely” against the proposed new agency); Phil Mattingly &
Carter Dougherty, Senate Republicans Plan to Block Consumer Bureau
While Seeking Changes, BLOOMBERG, May 6, 2011, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-05/republican-senators-to-block-consumernominee-absent-changes-1-.html (“Banking lobbyists fought the [CFPB]
from its inception. . . . The U.S. Chamber of Commerce pledged millions of
dollars to ‘kill’ the bureau, running campaign advertisements and working a
grassroots campaign that resulted in more than 200,000 letters designed to
sway lawmakers . . . .”).
15
Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid Consumers,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at B1; see also Johnson & Kwak, supra note 10,
at 198 (explaining that “[t]he banking lobby and its defenders closed ranks
against” the proposed agency); Paul Wiseman et al., Big Job Looms for New
Consumer Protection Agency, USA TODAY, June 24, 2010, at 1B
(“Financial industry lobbyists have fought the new agency through every
step of the legislative process.”).
16
Kaiser, supra note 14.
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consumers of financial services with the federal banking agencies in
order to ensure that any new consumer safeguards did not impair the
“safety and soundness” of financial institutions.17
Republican members of Congress supported the financial
services industry by strongly objecting to the creation of any
independent consumer financial protection agency and by insisting
that the consumer protection function must “remain with federal
banking regulators.”18 Republican leaders in the Senate bitterly
opposed the proposal by Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) to
establish an independent CFPB within the Fed. The disagreement
over CFPB ultimately prevented any bipartisan agreement on DoddFrank’s terms.19

17

Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14; see also R. Christian Bruce,
Regulatory Reform: Summers Urges Speed on Bank Reforms, Says
Consumer Protection Agency Essential, 93 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 506
(Sept. 22, 2009) (“[T]he Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial
Services Roundtable, and 23 other business groups said creating a standalone consumer protection agency with broad powers ‘is not the correct
approach.’ Instead . . . existing regulatory agencies could be given beefedup powers.”).
18
Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: State Attorneys General Make Push
For Consumer Financial Protection Agency, 94 BNA’S BANKING REPORT
309 (Feb. 16, 2010) (quoting argument by Senator Richard Shelby, the
ranking Republican member of the Senate Banking Committee, that
“consumer protection and safety and soundness regulation . . . must be
integrated with each other, not separated from each other”); Kaiser, supra
note 14 (quoting Senator Shelby’s view that an independent agency would
be “a folly and dangerous”).
19
See Cheyenne Hopkins, Oversight by House GOP to Shape Rules, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 8, 2010, at 1 (“Of all the parts in the [Dodd-Frank] bill, the
GOP objected most strenuously to the creation of a consumer protection
agency . . . .”); Stacy Kaper, Dodd Recounts Battles Over Reg Reform, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 24, 2010, at 1 (reporting that attempts by Senator Dodd to
agree on a bipartisan bill with Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL) “broke
down” because of Republican “hostility” to CFPB’s creation); James
Rowley & Lisa Lerer, Consumer Agency Still ‘Elephant’ in Room for
Finance Debate, BLOOMBERG, May 3, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2010-05-03/consumer-protection-still-elephant-in-room-forfinancal-overhaul-debate.html (describing the view of Senator Bob Corker
(R-TN) that CFPB’s creation was “the most contentious issue” during the
Senate’s consideration of Dodd-Frank and was “the elephant in the room”
that prevented any bipartisan agreement on Dodd-Frank).
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After Republicans failed to block CFPB’s creation, they
introduced an amendment on the Senate floor that would have
significantly reduced CFPB’s powers and removed its independence.
The Republican amendment would have placed the bureau firmly
under FDIC’s control and would have barred the bureau from
examining or regulating depository institutions.20 That amendment
was supported by all but three Republican Senators, but it was
defeated by the Democratic majority in the Senate.21
During the final Senate debates on Dodd-Frank, Senator
Shelby declared that CFPB would impose “massive new regulatory
burdens on businesses, large and small” and would “stifle innovation
in consumer financial products.”22 Other Republican members of
Congress similarly alleged that CFPB would wield vast and
unaccountable powers with devastating consequences for American
businesses and consumers.23 Republican legislators warned that
CFPB would be likely to adopt rules that could threaten the “safety
20

Senator Shelby’s amendment (S. 3826) would have (i) designated CFPB
as a division of FDIC, subject to FDIC’s oversight, (ii) required CFPB to
obtain FDIC approval before issuing any rule, and (iii) exempted all
depository institutions and most nonbank financial institutions from CFPB’s
jurisdiction. 156 CONG. REC. S3325-26 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of
Rep. Menendez).
21
Senator Shelby’s amendment failed by a vote of 38-61. All fifty-nine
Democratic Senators and two Republican Senators (Charles Grassley and
Olympia Snowe) voted against the amendment, while another Republican
(Senator Robert Bennett) did not vote. Id. at S3327–28 (reporting the roll
call vote on S. 3826).
22
156 CONG. REC. S5877 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (remarks of Rep.
Shelby).
23
See, e.g., id. at S5884 (remarks of Sen. Kyl, asserting that CFPB “will
have latitude to impose its will, with few checks and balances, on American
credit providers, all of which will result in more expense, more regulation,
higher costs for consumers, and less availability of credit”); id. at S5816
(daily ed. July 14, 2010) (remarks of Rep. Bond, declaring that CFPB would
be a “new superbureaucracy with unprecedented power” and its “decisions
on credit will be driven by the administration’s political will and agenda”);
id. at S3321-22 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Enzi, claiming that
CFPB would become “the single most powerful agency in the Federal
Government” and would exercise “unchecked power[,]” thereby creating
rules that would be “bad for small businesses and our communities, and . . .
bad for individual consumer choices and freedoms”); see also Jacoby, supra
note 142, at 100 n.6, 101 n.9 (quoting similar statements by Republican
members of Congress who opposed CFPB’s creation).
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and soundness” of financial institutions, notwithstanding any
objections raised by federal banking agencies.24 Dodd-Frank passed
by substantial margins in both houses of Congress, but only three
Republican House members and three Republican Senators voted in
favor of the legislation.25
B.

The Industry’s Post-Dodd-Frank Campaign to
Weaken CFPB

As soon as Dodd-Frank was passed, the financial services
industry and its Republican allies began a new campaign to reduce
CFPB’s independence and authority. During the midterm elections of
2010, financial institutions and their trade groups gave a significant
majority of their political contributions to Republican congressional
candidates. The financial services industry’s strong backing for
Republican candidates in 2010 represented a sharp reversal from the
industry’s political behavior in 2006 and 2008, when the industry
gave a majority of its financial support to Democratic candidates.
The financial industry’s shift in contributions reflected the industry’s

24

See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S5816 (daily ed. July 14, 2010) (remarks of
Sen. Bond) (“Politics will then decide how to allocate credit while operating
outside the framework of safety and soundness, thus putting more risk back
into the system when we were supposed to be taking risk out of the
system."); id. at S3868 (daily ed. May 18, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Corker)
(“The consumer protection agency has the ability to write rules with no veto
authority against the safety and soundness of financial institutions."); id. at
S3312 (daily ed. May 6, 2010) (remarks of Sen. Shelby) (“Under the Dodd
bill, the [CFPB] would issue new rules without considering their impact on
safety and soundness of financial institutions.”).
25
Mike Ferrulo, Regulatory Reform: House Clears Financial Reform Bill
Along Party Lines, Senate Action Delayed, 95 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 5
(July 6, 2010) (reporting that Dodd-Frank passed by a vote of 237-192 in
the House, and stating that “[t]hree Republicans voted for the bill and 19
Democrats voted against it.”); Mike Ferrulo et al., Regulatory Reform:
Senate Sends Financial Regulatory To White House for President’s
Signature, 95 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 90 (July 20, 2010) (reporting that
Dodd-Frank passed by a vote of 60-39 in the Senate, and stating that
Republican Senators Scott Brown, Susan Collins and Olympia Snowe voted
in favor of Dodd-Frank while Senator Russ Feingold “was the sole
Democrat in opposition”).
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anger and frustration over Dodd-Frank’s passage and CFPB’s
creation.26
The Republicans secured control of the House and captured
several additional seats in the Senate. Following the 2010 elections,
Republican congressional leaders announced plans to introduce
legislation that would change CFPB’s structure and weaken its
independence.27 During the spring of 2011, Republican leaders in the
House introduced bills that would (i) establish a multimember board
to govern CFPB, (ii) give federal prudential regulators a stronger
potential veto over CFPB’s rulemaking, and (iii) enable Congress to

26

For discussions of the financial services industry’s decision to shift its
political support from Democrats to Republicans, due to the industry’s
resentment over Dodd-Frank’s passage and CFPB’s establishment, see T.W.
Farnham & Paul Kane, Democratic campaign committees losing big Wall
Street donors, WASH. POST, July 6, 2010, at A01(“A revolt among big
donors on Wall Street is hurting fundraising for the Democrats' two
congressional campaign committees, with contributions from the world's
financial capital down 65 percent from two years ago.”); Stacy Kaper,
Banks Use Election as Payback for Reg Reform, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7,
2010, at 1 (“Though Democrats scored a big political victory in passing
regulatory reform, many are already paying for it as the financial services
industry directs more of its contributions toward Republicans and moderates
who tried to pare back the revamp.”); Brody Mullins & Alicia Mundy,
Corporate Political Giving Swings Toward the GOP, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21,
2010, at A5 (“Corporations have begun to send a majority of donations
from their political action committees to Republican candidates, a reversal
from the trend of the past three years.”); Robert Schmidt, Wall Street
Banking on Republicans to Push Legislative Goals, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 14,
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-14/wall-street-banking-onrepublicans-to-push-legislative-goals.html (“Financial firms . . . for most of
this year have been shifting political contributions to Republicans . . . .”);
see also Kevin Wack, Big Banks Electing to Give Obama Less Cash, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 30, 2011, at 1 (reporting that “[m]any bankers are still
particularly angry about Dodd-Frank, which they view as regulatory
overkill”).
27
Clea Benson & Phil Mattingly, Firms That Fought Dodd-Frank May
Profit Under Republican House, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2010, http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-03/companies-that-fought-dodd-frank-mayprofit-under-republican-u-s-house.html; Stacy Kaper, Review 2010/Preview
2011: Redrawing the Battle Lines on Reform, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at
1; Stacy Kaper, ELECTIONS 2010: Bachus Plots Agenda, But Faces
Leadership Challenge, AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 2010, at 4.
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control CFPB’s budget through the appropriations process.28
Financial industry trade groups and major banks strongly supported
Republican efforts to reduce CFPB’s autonomy and authority, and
they urged House members to pass the Republican bills.29
On July 21, 2011 (the first anniversary of Dodd-Frank’s
enactment), the House of Representatives passed legislation that
would (i) create a five-member commission to oversee CFPB, (ii)
suspend all of CFPB’s powers until the Senate confirmed a Director
of CFPB, and (iii) expand the authority of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to veto CFPB’s regulations.30 Under
28

Kate Davidson, Subcommittee Approves Bills to Revamp CFPB, AM.
BANKER, May 5, 2011, at 3; Brady Dennis & Ylan Q. Mui, Fight over
consumer bureau about to enter next phase ,WASH. POST, May 4, 2011, at
A17; Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: GOP Lawmakers Take First
Legislative Steps to Restructure New Consumer Bureau, 96 BNA’S
BANKING REPORT 850 (May 10, 2011); Cheyenne Hopkins, Political
Sniping Dominates House Hearing on the CFPB, AM. BANKER, Apr. 7,
2011, at 3; Jennifer Liberto, Republicans aim to weaken consumer bureau,
CNN MONEY, Apr. 6, 2011, http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/06/news/
economy/republicans_consumer_bureau/index.htm.
29
See, e.g., Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14 (reporting that the
American Bankers Ass’n, Consumer Bankers Ass’n, Bank of America,
Citigroup and Capital One lobbied in support of the Republican-backed
House bills to change CFPB); New consumer agency under fire from GOP,
banks, ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Mar. 16, 2011 (describing support for
Republican legislation among financial industry trade groups); Memo from
Floyd Stoner, Exec. Vice President, Am. Bankers Assoc., to Members of the
U.S. House of Representatives (July 20, 2011), available at
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/76DCD307-2D7E-48A6-A10F623175F0AEAD/72899/HouseMemoreCFPBBill072011.pdf
(expressing
support for Republican legislation to change CFPB); Letter from Richard
Hunt, President of the Consumer Bankers Assoc., to Representative Shelley
Moore Capito (May 3, 2011).
30
Kate Davidson & Joe Adler, As CFPB Takes Flight, GOP Bill Aims to
Clip Its Wings, AM. BANKER, July 22, 2011, at 2 (“The legislation . . . would
replace the agency's director with a five-member commission, mak[ing] it
easier for other regulators to override its rules and suspend its powers until a
permanent leader is in place.”); Mike Ferullo, Consumer Protection: House
Approves Legislation to Alter CFPB As Agency Gets Underway: Obama
Vows Veto, 97 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 163 (July 26, 2011) (stating that
the House bill (H.R. 1315) passed by a vote of 241-173 and all but one
Republican member voted for the bill, while all but ten Democratic
members voted against it).
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the House bill, a majority of FSOC’s members could vote to override
any CFPB regulation that they found to be inconsistent with the safe
and sound operations of U.S. financial institutions, and CFPB would
be barred from participating in any override vote by FSOC.31 In
contrast, as discussed below, Dodd-Frank permits FSOC to veto a
CFPB regulation only if two-thirds of FSOC’s members (including
CFPB) determine that the challenged regulation would threaten the
safety and soundness of the entire U.S. banking system or the
stability of the entire U.S. financial system.32 Republicans also
sponsored a separate House bill that would make all of CFPB’s
funding subject to congressional appropriations by 2013.33
Republicans in the Senate actively supported the efforts of
their House colleagues. On May 5, 2011, Senator Richard Shelby and
forty-three other Republican Senators declared that they would block
Senate confirmation of any CFPB Director until Congress passed
legislation that incorporated the three principal changes included in
the House bills.34 Senator Shelby and his Republican colleagues
demanded that Congress establish a multimember board to govern
CFPB, give federal banking agencies a “safety-and-soundness check”
over CFPB’s rules and ensure congressional control over CFPB’s
budget.35 The American Bankers Association applauded the
31

Larry Bivins, House passes Duffy bill, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, July 21,
2011 (available on Lexis).
32
See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
33
Thecla Fabian, Appropriations: Obama Opposes Financial Services
Elements Within House Spending Bill as It Nears Floor, 97 BNA’S
BANKING REPORT 112 (July 19, 2011) (describing H.R. 2434, which would
“make CFPB’s funding subject to the annual appropriations process
beginning in fiscal 2013”); Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: House
GOP Seeks Control of CFPB Funding As Agency Readies for July 21 Start
Date, 96 BNA’S BANKING REPORT 1137 (June 21, 2011) (discussing
introduction of the measure by House Republicans).
34
Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: Republican Senators Vow to Block
Nominee For CFPB Without Changes to New Agency, 96 BNA’S BANKING
REPORT 849 (May 10, 2011) (describing letter sent by Republican Senators
to President Obama); see also Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14
(reporting that “[t]he structural changes proposed by the senators in their
letter echo proposals advancing in the Republican-controlled House”).
35
News Release by Richard Shelby, United States Senator, Alabama, 44
U.S. Sens. To Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation (May 5, 2011),
available
at
http://shelby.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases?
ID=893bc8b0-2e73-4555-8441-d51e0ccd1d17 (citing to “text of [a] letter to
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Republican Senators for insisting on those changes as a precondition
for confirming any Director of CFPB.36
During the Senate Banking Committee's hearing on July 19,
2011, Senator Shelby again maintained that the CFPB was a “huge
new and entirely unaccountable bureaucracy” that lacked any
“meaningful congressional oversight.”37 Senator Shelby repeated the
Republican demands for fundamental changes in CFPB’s
governance, funding and authority. Witnesses for the American
Bankers Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly
supported Senator Shelby’s position at the hearing.38 The financial
services industry also continued its pattern of giving the great
majority of its contributions to Republican leaders in 2011, thereby
rewarding Republicans for their vigorous opposition to Dodd-Frank
and CFPB.39
President Obama, declaring, inter alia, that ‘[t]he present structure of
[CFPB] . . . violates basic principles of accountability . . . .’”). Two
Republican Senators – Scott Brown of Massachusetts and Lisa Murkowski
of Alaska – did not sign Senator Shelby’s letter; Mattingly & Dougherty,
supra note 14.
36
Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 14 (quoting statement by Frank
Keating, head of the American Bankers Association).
37
Thecla Fabian, Consumer Protection: Senate Banking Hearing Highlights
Continued CFPB Structure, ‘Accountability’ Stalemate, 97 BNA’S
BANKING REPORT 165 (July 26, 2011) (quoting Senator Shelby’s opening
statement at a hearing of the Senate Banking Committee on July 19, 2011).
In a contemporary op-ed, Senator Shelby denounced the CFPB as “the most
powerful yet unaccountable bureaucracy in the federal government.”
Richard Shelby, The Danger of an Unaccountable ‘Consumer-Protection’
Czar, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2011, at A17. During a Senate committee
hearing on September 6, 2011, Senator David Vitter (R-LA) similarly
argued that “[t]here’s a real danger of the CFPB being a super bureaucracy
that does a lot of damage to the economy by overreaching in its attempts to
make decisions for consumers.” Kate Davidson, Cordray Hearing Devolves
into Partisan Fight Over CFPB Structure, AM. BANKER, Sept. 7, 2011.
38
Fabian, supra note 37.
39
Jonathan D. Salant & Lisa Lerer, Romney Lures Obama Wall Street
Donors, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 27, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-09-27/romney-lures-obama-wall-street-donors-in-race-for-campaigncash.html (“Republican presidential hopeful Mitt Romney has raised more
than twice as much money from Wall Street as Barack Obama . . . .”);
Wack, supra note 26 (“In 2008, Barack Obama was the toast of Wall Street.
But so far in the 2012 race, the six largest U.S. banks have switched sides in
a dramatic way, and are giving far more money to GOP hopeful Mitt
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Meanwhile, a contemporaneous poll commissioned by
Consumer Reports reported that 74% of respondents favored the
creation of CFPB as an independent agency with the sole mission of
protecting consumers of financial services. The poll showed that
large majorities of Democrats, independents and Republicans
supported CFPB and its mission.40 More than four-fifths of the poll
respondents agreed that CFPB’s “top priorities” should include
“strengthening and enforcing rules against deceptive and unfair
practices” by financial institutions and “requiring that mortgage and
other documents be easier for consumers to understand.”41
Nearly three-quarters of the poll’s respondents also
supported Dodd-Frank as a whole, including a majority of
Romney than they are to the sitting president. . . . While Obama has touted
Dodd-Frank as an achievement of his first term, Romney has criticized the
law.”); Kevin Wack, GOP Fundraising Beats Dems’, AM. BANKER, Aug.
31, 2011, at 3 (reporting that Rep. Spencer Bachus and Sen. Richard Shelby,
the Republican leaders on the House and Senate banking committees, had
received much larger amounts of campaign contributions in 2011 than their
Democratic counterparts, Rep. Barney Frank and Sen. Tim Johnson, and a
larger percentage of the Republicans’ contributions came from the financial
services industry); William Selway & Martin Z. Baum, Derivatives: Bachus
Is Wall Street’s Man in Jefferson County, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
May 31 – June 5, 2011, at 32 (observing that Rep. Bachus was a “leading
critic of the Dodd-Frank law” and “the third-biggest recipient of donations
from financial companies” over the past two decades); Gary Rivlin, The
Billion Dollar Bank Heist: How the financial industry is buying off
Washington – and killing reform, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2011, at 9
(describing the financial services industry’s large contributions to
Republican leaders who opposed Dodd-Frank and CFPB, including Rep.
Sean Duffy (R-WI), who described CFPB as a “rogue agency” with an
“authoritarian structure”).
40
Chris Morran, Poll: Overwhelming Majority of Voters Want a Strong,
Undiluted CFPB, CONSUMERIST, July 19, 2011 (stating that “83% of
Democrats, 73% of independents and 68% of Republicans” expressed
support in the poll for a strong CFPB) (Newstex Web Blog available on
Lexis).
41
New Poll Shows Strong Support for Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, PR NEWSWIRE, July 20, 2011 (describing press release issued by
Consumers Union summarizing the poll’s results); see also Jim
Puzzanghera, GOVERNMENT: Fight over watchdog continues, L.A. TIMES,
July 21, 2011, at B1 (“Advocacy group Consumers Union on Wednesday
released results of a recent poll showing that 74% of respondents supported
the new bureau.”).
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Republican respondents.42 Given the strong public backing for CFPB
and Dodd-Frank, as well as widespread popular hostility toward
large financial institutions, Republican leaders evidently concluded
that their most prudent course of action would be to push for
legislation imposing tight restrictions on CFPB instead of seeking to
eliminate the bureau.43 Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) alleged
that the Republican-backed House legislation “is as close as
[Republicans] dare come now, because of public opinion, to
abolishing the whole agency. . . . They do understand that politically
it’s not a good idea to be fully straightforward about their intentions,
and they’d really like to repeal it.”44
In October 2011, the Senate Banking Committee approved
President Obama’s nomination of Richard Cordray as the CFPB’s
first Director by a party-line vote of 12-10, with all Republican
committee members voting against the nomination.45 Two months
42

Kevin Wack, Why GOP Changed Its Dodd-Frank Strategy, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 1, 2011, at 1 (reporting that “[71%] of the poll’s respondents favored
Dodd-Frank as a whole, including 60% of Republicans”); see also Jonathan
Chait, TRB from Washington: Dithering Heights: Obama shows a new level
of passivity on financial reform, NEW REPUBLIC, July 14, 2011, at 2 (stating
that “[p]olls in 2010 showed overwhelming support for strong financial
regulation, and what little information has come out since suggests strong
anti-Wall Street sentiment remains”).
43
Wack, supra note 42; Rivlin, supra note 39; see also Andrew EdgecliffeJohnson & Francesco Guerrera, US public loses faith in business, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c60c01ba-27e5-11e08abc-00144feab49a.html#axzz1o5AWnRxq (reporting that “the number of
Americans who trust US banks has dropped to a low of 25 per cent, down
from 33 per cent a year ago and 71 per cent before the financial crisis”);
Richard Burnett, Consumers unhappy with banks, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Dec. 23, 2010, at B5; Americans’ anger not easing over banks’ practices,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 10, 2010, at P3D.
44
Davidson & Adler, supra note 30 (quoting Rep. Frank). Similarly, Senate
Banking Committee chairman Tim Johnson (D-SD) criticized Republican
Senators for their “misleading claim of no CFPB accountability” and
declared that Republicans were trying to “destroy the Bureau’s ability to do
its job of protecting American consumers . . . .” Davidson, supra note 37.
45
Kate Davidson, Senate Panel Approves Nomination for CFPB Director,
AM. BANKER, Oct. 7, 2011; Carter Dougherty, Consumer Bureau
Nomination Goes to Senate, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 6, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-06/consumer-bureau-nomineeapproved-by-senate-banking-committee.html (“Today's 12-10 vote sends
the nomination to the full Senate . . . .”); Jessica Wehrman, Confirmation
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later, forty-five Republican Senators (more than enough to sustain a
filibuster) voted to block the Senate’s confirmation of Mr. Cordray.
At the same time, Senate Republican leaders reaffirmed their
intention to prevent confirmation of any nominee for Director until
Congress passed legislation to satisfy their demands for changes in
CFPB’s governance, authority and funding.46
By preventing Senate confirmation of any Director,
Republicans and the financial services industry greatly reduced
CFPB’s ability to exercise the powers that Dodd-Frank conferred on
CFPB on July 21, 2011. According to a joint legal opinion prepared
by the Inspectors General (“IGs”) of the Treasury Department and
the Fed, CFPB may take the following actions without a Senateconfirmed Director: (i) issuing rules, orders and guidance under
existing federal consumer financial laws that were enforced by other
federal agencies prior to the transfer of their functions to CFPB on
July 21, 2011, (ii) enforcing previous orders, agreements and other
rulings issued by those agencies under such laws, and (iii) examining
depository institutions with assets of more than $10 billion.47
Battle: Cordray passes first test, but that may be it, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 7, 2011, at 1A.
46
Carter Dougherty, Senate Republicans Block Cordray for CFPB,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 8, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/201112-08/senate-republicans-block-obama-nominee-cordray-as-head-ofconsumer-bureau.html; Kevin Wack, Senate Republicans Block Cordray
Nomination, AM. BANKER, Dec. 9, 2011. All 52 Democratic Senators and
one Republican Senator – Scott Brown (R-MA) – voted in favor of Mr.
Cordray’s confirmation. Id.
47
In reaching this conclusion, the Inspectors General relied on Section
1066(a) of Dodd-Frank. Section 1066(a) authorizes the Treasury Secretary
to perform the functions prescribed under Sections 1061-67 of Dodd-Frank
(dealing with the transfer of consumer financial protection functions from
other agencies) “until the Director of [CFPB] is confirmed by the Senate.”
Dodd-Frank § 1066(a). See Letter from Eric M. Thorson and Elizabeth A.
Coleman to Rep. Spencer Bachus and Rep. Judy Biggert, forwarding “Joint
Response by the Inspectors General of the Department of the Treasury and
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: Request for Information
Regarding the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection,” at 4-6, (Jan. 10,
2011),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/ig/Documents/OIG-CA%2011004%20Committee%20of%20
Financial%20Services%20Response%20CFPB.pdf (“If the Bureau does not
have a Senate-confirmed Director by the designated transfer date, the
Bureau may continue to operate under the Secretary's section 1066(a)
authority.”).
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However, the Fed and Treasury IGs concluded that CFPB must have
a Senate-confirmed Director in order to exercise its other powers
under Dodd-Frank, including (1) prescribing rules under new
statutory authorities not transferred from other federal agencies, (2)
issuing rules and orders prohibiting unfair, deceptive and abusive
acts and practices, and (3) supervising nondepository providers of
consumer financial services.48
Thus, according to the joint opinion of the Fed and Treasury
IGs, “[u]ntil the Senate confirms a director, the CFPB cannot oversee
non-bank lenders or assume enhanced consumer protection powers
mandated under [Dodd-Frank].”49 Assuming the correctness of that
opinion, the absence of a Senate-confirmed Director would prevent
CFPB from establishing the type of consumer financial protection
regime envisioned by Dodd-Frank—namely, a regime that ensures a
“level playing field for all banks and . . . nondepository financial
companies” and that “ha[s] enough flexibility to address future
problems as they arise.”50 Although CFPB’s inability to regulate
nonbanks appeared to disadvantage banks, some bankers were
prepared to accept an uneven playing field as long as it included a
referee (i.e., CFPB) with sharply limited powers.51
48

Letter from Thorson & Coleman, supra note 47, at 6-7. See infra note 68
and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s authority to supervise and
examine nondepository providers of consumer financial services).
49
Mike Ferrulo, Consumer Protection: House Approves Legislation to Alter
CFPB As Agency Gets Underway; Obama Vows Veto, 97 BNA’S BANKING
REPORT 163, 163 (July 26, 2011); see also Kate Davidson, Leaderless
CFPB Not a Blessing for Bankers, AM. BANKER, July 12, 2011, at 1
(describing limitations on CFPB’s authority without a Director).
50
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010); see also Davidson, supra note 49, at 1
(quoting Amy Friend, former Senate Banking Committee chief counsel,
who explained that “[t]he objective in creating [CFPB] was to have an
agency that would focus more on consumer protection than the banking
agencies had, and would be able to fully scrutinize larger nonbanks in
particular”).
51
See Davidson, supra note 49, at 1 (stating that “some bankers are secretly
gleeful the [CFPB] does not yet have a director”). As discussed supra in
note 13, President Obama issued a recess appointment in January 2012 to
install Richard Cordary as CFPB’s first Director. However, the validity of
that appointment was disputed by Republican members of Congress, and
some observers predicted that adversely affected parties would file lawsuits
to challenge Mr. Cordray’s future rulemaking and enforcement actions as
Director. Maria Aspan, Cordray Recess Appointment Will ‘Weaken’ CFPB
– Barofsky, AM. BANKER Jan. 6, 2012, at 1 (quoting Neil Barofsky, former
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For example, Andrew Kahr, (founder of Providian, the
highly controversial credit card bank), argued in July 2011 that banks
should prefer a leaderless CFPB, notwithstanding any concerns about
the lack of a “level playing field” with nonbanks.52 Mr. Kahr argued
that “[f]or at least 200 years, banks have benefited from a playing
field tilted sharply in [their] favor,” and “[t]hat’s why nonbanks want
to own banks.”53 However, Mr. Kahr warned:

special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, who
warned that Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment had created “legal
uncertainties and litigation that are ‘going to weaken the [CFPB]’”); Kate
Davidson, Will Cordray Recess Appointment Cloud CFPB’s Future?, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 5, 2012, at 1 (reporting that Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment
“set the stage for a showdown over the [CFPB’s] authority that could take
years to resolve”).
52
Andrew Kahr, Let’s Keep the CFPB Leaderless, AM. BANKER, July 26,
2011, at 6 [hereinafter Kahr, CFPB Leaderless]. According to one of his
previous op-eds, Mr. Kahr “is a principal in Credit Builders LLC, a
financial product development company, and was the founding chief
executive of Providian Financial Corp.” Andrew Kahr, It’s Official:
‘Prepaid’ Cards Face Cap, AM. BANKER, July 6, 2011, at 8 [hereinafter
Kahr, It's Official]. Mr. Kahr was CEO of Providian from the early 1980s to
1988, and he subsequently served as a consultant to Providian from 1988 to
2000. According to one news account, he was “the genius behind
Providian’s success” in marketing high-cost credit cards to high-risk
borrowers during the 1990s. Sam Zuckerman, How Providian Misled Card
Holders, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 5, 2002, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2002/05/05/MN138910.DTL. In 2000, Providian
paid $300 million to settle enforcement actions brought by state and federal
officials alleging deceptive and predatory lending practices. “Mr. Kahr was
not charged with wrongdoing,” but his “consulting contract was ended in
2000." Id.; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s Preemption Rules
Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual
Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 225, 315-16 (2004) (referring to enforcement actions against Providian);
see also Duncan A. MacDonald, Comptroller Has Duty to Clean Up Card
Pricing Mess, AM. BANKER, Nov. 21, 2003, at 17 (publishing a letter from a
former general counsel of Citigroup’s European and North American credit
card businesses, who alleged that Providian’s “telemarketing and pricing
practices . . . bordered on the criminal. For a decade Providian had been
well known in the [credit] card industry as the poster child of abusive
consumer practices”).
53
Kahr, CFPB Leaderless, supra note 52, at 6.
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[O]nce a director is confirmed banks will suffer
severely. The CFPB will then have the power, under
Dodd-Frank, to prohibit 'unfair' practices by banks.
(Until the CFPB has a director, no regulator has that
power.)
...
[Consider a scenario in which] the Republicans
control both houses of Congress after the 2012
election. We might then hope for some rollback of
CFPB authority. Even if there’s only one chance in
four of that, banks should prefer to avoid
promulgation of very costly regulations and
enforcement actions based on the CFPB’s new
powers until that election.54
Mr. Kahr added (perhaps in jest), “Let the bad times roll!”55 In
explaining why banks should oppose a Senate-confirmed CFPB
Director, Mr. Kahr noted that a CFPB Director would have authority
to condemn “unfair” consumer financial products, which could
potentially include $39 bank overdraft fees and high-cost “credit
protection products” offered by banks.56 Mr. Kahr pointed out that
54

Id.
Id. In a 1999 memo to a Providian executive, Mr. Kahr observed,
“Making people pay for access to credit is a lucrative business wherever it is
practiced. . . . The trick is charging a lot, repeatedly, for small doses of
incremental credit.” Zuckerman, supra note 52 (quoting March 1999 memo
from Mr. Kahr to Providian Executive Vice President David Alvarez). In a
1998 memo to Providian executives, Mr. Kahr recommended that Providian
should not disclose that some of its credit cards lacked any “grace period”
before customer payments were due. Instead of a “no grace period”
disclosure, Mr. Kahr suggested that Providian should use “one of the
numerous ideas for a ‘limited’ grace period that have been put forward.
‘Limited’ meaning that the customer responds to (it) as if there were a grace
period, but in reality almost no one gets the benefit of it.” Id. (quoting July
1998 memo from Mr. Kahr to Mr. Alvarez and Dawn Greiner, Providian’s
head of new product development).
56
Kahr, CFPB Leaderless, supra note 52, at 6; see also infra notes 606, 111
and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s authority to prohibit “unfair”
acts or practices). Mr. Kahr’s concern that CFPB might act to regulate
overdraft fees was not misplaced. In September 2011, Raj Date, assistant to
the Treasury Secretary for administering CFPB, indicated that the bureau
would take a “closer look” at overdraft programs. Kate Davidson, New
55
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bank regulators permitted profit margins for bank credit protection
products that were much higher than the profit margins allowed by
state insurance regulators for similar products sold by insurance
companies. In Mr. Kahr’s view, that differential provided “yet
another example of a very unlevel playing field, enormously
favorable to banks versus nonbanks.”57 Accordingly, he asked: “Is
this the time to activate additional elements of [consumer
compliance] regulation that can only render banks less profitable—
and perhaps more inclined to take greater risks in order to achieve
adequate return?”58
III.

CFPB’s Powers, Governance and Funding Are Similar to
Those of Other Financial Regulators

CFPB’s powers, governance, and funding are hardly
unprecedented among federal financial regulators. CFPB’s
rulemaking and enforcement authorities resemble those of other
federal bank regulators. CFPB’s leadership by a single director is
similar to the governance structure of OCC and FHFA. CFPB’s
ability to fund its operations without relying on congressional
appropriations is comparable to other financial regulators except for
CFTC and SEC. While the financial services industry and its
Republican allies have vigorously attacked CFPB’s perceived
independence, they have strongly defended the autonomy enjoyed by
OCC and FHFA, which represent the closest regulatory analogues to
CFPB's structure. Thus, it appears that the financial industry and its
legislative supporters are primarily opposed to CFPB’s expected
policy choices, not its structural characteristics.

CFPB Leader Pledges ‘Tough’ Enforcement Regime, AM. BANKER, Sept.
16, 2011, at 2 (summarizing a speech by Mr. Date on Sept. 15, 2011).
57
Kahr, CFPB Leaderless supra note 52, at 6. For additional analysis of the
advantages that banks – especially large banks – enjoy relative to nonbanks
because of banks’ access to federal safety net subsidies, see Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1588-93 (2007); see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-toFail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 957-59, 980-86 (2011) [hereinafter
Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem] (describing the enormous explicit and
implicit subsidies that U.S. and foreign governments provided to “too-bigto-fail” banks during the recent financial crisis).
58
Kahr, CFPB Leaderless, supra note 52, at 6.
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CFPB’s Powers, Governance and Funding

Title X of Dodd-Frank, designated as the “Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010” (“CFP Act”), establishes CFPB as
an “independent bureau” within the FRB to “regulate the offering
and provision of consumer financial products or services under the
Federal consumer financial laws.”59 CFPB’s statutory mission is “to
implement and . . . enforce Federal consumer financial law
consistently for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have
access to markets for consumer financial products and services [that]
are fair, transparent, and competitive.”60 The “[f]ederal consumer
financial law[s]” that fall within CFPB’s jurisdiction include
eighteen previously enacted federal statutes, as well as the “new
consumer financial protection mandates prescribed by the [CFP]
Act.”61
Title X provides that CFPB will be administered by a single
Director.62 The President appoints CFPB’s Director for a five-year
term with the Senate’s advice and consent, and the President may
remove the Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”63 The Director may issue rules, orders and
guidance “to administer and carry out the purposes and objectives of
the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions

59

Dodd-Frank § 1011(a); see generally Michael B. Mierzewski et al., The
Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products and Services,
127 BANKING L. J. 722 (2010) (providing a helpful overview of CFPB's
authority under Title X).
60
Dodd–Frank § 1021(a).
61
Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 724-25; see also Dodd-Frank §
1002(14) (defining “Federal consumer financial law” to include Title X of
Dodd-Frank, eighteen federal consumer protection statutes that are
enumerated in Dodd-Frank § 1002(12), and certain other laws).
62
Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(1). As previously discussed, President Obama
invoked his constitutional power of recess appointment and appointed
Richard Cordray as CFPB’s first Director in January 2012. However, the
validity of that appointment was disputed by Republican members of
Congress and some analysts. See supra notes 13, 51.
63
Id. § 1011(c). The Supreme Court has observed, in the context of a
similar removal statute, that the quoted terms “are very broad and . . . could
sustain removal of a [federal official] for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions." Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986).
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thereof.”64 The Director also hires and manages CFPB’s employees.65
CFPB may issue regulations to implement federal consumer financial
laws and may also issue rules or orders to prohibit “unfair, deceptive,
or abusive acts or practices” (UDAAP) in consumer financial
services.66 CFPB may also issue regulations to ensure that “the
features of any consumer financial product or service . . . are fully,
accurately, and, effectively disclosed to consumers in a manner that
permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks
associated with the product or service.”67
Further, Title X empowers CFPB to supervise and examine
depository institutions with assets of more than $10 billion (and their
affiliates) as well as all nondepository providers of consumer
financial services.68 CFPB may pursue a variety of enforcement
powers to prevent violations of Title X and CFPB’s regulations
thereunder, or any of the eighteen federal consumer financial statutes
enumerated in Section 1002(12) of Dodd-Frank.69 CFPB’s
enforcement authorities include (i) undertaking investigations and
performing administrative discovery, (ii) initiating administrative
enforcement proceedings, (iii) filing judicial enforcement actions,
and (iv) referring criminal charges to the Department of Justice.70
64

Dodd-Frank § 1022(a).
Id. §1013(a).
66
Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b), 1031(b).
67
Id. § 1032(a).
68
Depository institutions with assets of $10 billion or less will be examined
by federal banking agencies to assess their compliance with consumer
financial protection laws. Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 731-32. CFPB
has authority (i) to obtain reports from smaller depository institutions, (ii) to
include one of CFPB’s examiners on the examination teams for such
depository institutions, and (iii) to provide input to the primary regulators of
such institutions with regard to the scope and conduct of examinations, the
contents of examination reports and examination ratings. Dodd-Frank, §
1026.
69
Dodd-Frank, §§ 1002(12), 1031, 1036(a)(1)(B), 1052-1055. CFPB may
not bring an administrative enforcement hearing to enforce an enumerated
federal consumer financial law to the extent that the law in question
specifically limits CFPB’s authority to do so. Id. § 1053(a)(2).
70
Id. §§ 1052-56; see Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 732-35
(describing CFPB’s enforcement powers). CFPB has authority to represent
itself in the Supreme Court if it submits a request to the Attorney General
and the Attorney General concurs or acquiesces in that request. Dodd-Frank
§ 1054(e).
65

2011-2012

MISGUIDED QUEST TO UNDERMINE THE CFPB

903

CFPB may use administrative or judicial proceedings to
obtain a wide range of legal and equitable remedies, including
refunds, restitution, damages, cease-and-desist orders, civil money
penalties and injunctive relief.71 CFPB’s administrative and judicial
enforcement powers are generally similar to those granted to federal
banking agencies and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).72 Like
the FTC, CFPB is statutorily barred from imposing punitive
damages.73
Thus, Title X vests CFPB with broadly-defined powers to
regulate providers of consumer financial products and services.74
However, CFPB may not regulate the ability of persons to carry on
the businesses of insurance, securities, commodity trading, or
managing employee benefit or compensation plans.75 In addition,
sellers of nonfinancial goods and manufactured homes, real estate
brokers, auto dealers, attorneys, accountants and tax preparers are not
subject to CFPB’s jurisdiction unless they engage in offering covered
financial products or services.76
Title X protects CFPB’s autonomy in several ways. Title X
prohibits FRB from taking any of the following actions: (i)
intervening in any CFPB examination, enforcement action or other
proceeding; (ii) appointing, directing or removing any CFPB officer
or employee; (iii) combining CFPB or any of its functions with any
other FRB unit; (iv) reviewing, approving, or delaying any CFPB
71

Id. §§ 1053-1055.
See infra notes 103-04 (discussing enforcement powers of federal banking
agencies); 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57b, 57b-1 (2006) (prescribing the FTC’s
enforcement authorities).
73
15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (prohibiting FTC from assessing punitive damages);
Dodd-Frank, § 1055(a)(3) (imposing the same prohibition on CFPB).
74
See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1002(5), (6), (26) (defining “consumer financial
product or service,” “covered person,” and “service provider”); Mierzewski
et al., supra note 59, at 726 (describing persons, products and services that
are regulated under Title X).
75
Dodd-Frank § 1027(f)-(i), (m).
76
See id. §§ 1027(a)-(e), 1029 (imposing further restrictions to the CFPB's
regulatory authority); H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 (2010) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731 (discussing exclusions from
CFPB's jurisdiction for the above types of firms); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at
160, 169–71 (2010) (same); Mierzewski et al., supra note 59, at 727-28
(explaining that the listed exclusions apply "to the extent that the parties are
not engaged in offering a consumer financial product or service, or are not
separately subject to an enumerated consumer law").
72
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rule or order; or (v) reviewing or approving any legislative
recommendations, testimony, or comments of CFPB’s Director.77
Thus, Title X “makes clear that [CFPB] is to function without any
interference by [FRB].”78
In addition, Title X requires FRB to provide CFPB with
annual funding up to a maximum limit of approximately $500
million (to be adjusted for inflation).79 CFPB’s guaranteed funding
from FRB is not subject to congressional appropriations.80 However,
if CFPB determines that its guaranteed funding from the FRB is
inadequate to carry out its responsibilities, CFPB must seek
additional funds from Congress through the appropriations process.81
B.

Comparing the Powers, Governance and Funding
of CFPB and Other Financial Regulators

CFPB's powers are comparable to those of other federal
financial regulators. As explained in the Senate report, Dodd-Frank’s
provisions for CFPB were “modeled on similar statutes governing
the [OCC] and the Office of Thrift Supervision [(“OTS”)], which are
located within the Department of Treasury.”82 Dodd-Frank abolished
OTS,83 but OCC continues to function as an autonomous bureau of
the Treasury pursuant to the National Bank Act (“NBA”).84
77

Dodd-Frank § 1012(c).
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 161 (2010).
79
FRB must provide annual funding to CFPB in an “amount determined by
[CFPB’s] Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out [CFPB’s]
authorities” in view of other funding available to CFPB, up to the following
maximum limits: "(i) 10% of the Fed’s 2009 operating expenses in fiscal
year 2011, (ii) 11% of such expenses in fiscal year 2012, and (iii) 12% of
such expenses in each subsequent fiscal year, with appropriate increases to
reflect future inflation." Dodd-Frank § 1017(a). Dodd-Frank will require
FRB to provide approximately $500 million of funding to CFPB in fiscal
year 2013 and subsequent years. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 164 (2010)
(graph).
80
Dodd-Frank § 1017(a)(2)(C).
81
Id. § 1017(e).
82
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 161 (2010).
83
Dodd-Frank § 313. Dodd-Frank transfers the functions of OTS to FDIC,
FRB and OCC. Id. § 312.
84
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 61-62 (4th
ed. 2009).
78
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Under the NBA, OCC is administered by a single official,
the Comptroller of the Currency (“Comptroller”).85 Like the CFPB’s
Director, the OCC's Comptroller is appointed by the President for a
five-year term, with the advice and consent of the Senate.86 The
Comptroller’s autonomy is similar to that of the CFPB's Director.
The Treasury cannot prevent or delay the issuance of any OCC
regulation, and the Treasury may not intervene in any matter before
the Comptroller (including an agency enforcement action) unless
specifically authorized by law.87
FHFA is responsible for regulating Fannie Mae (“Fannie”),
Freddie Mac (“Freddie”) and the Federal Home Loan Banks
(“FHLBs”).88 Like the CFPB’s Director and the OCC's Comptroller,
the FHFA’s Director serves as the single head of the agency.89 The
FHFA Director’s mode of appointment and term of office are similar
to the CFPB’s Director and the Comptroller. The President appoints
the FHFA’s Director for a five-year term with the Senate’s advice
and consent, but the President may also remove the FHFA’s Director
“for cause.”90 In contrast to the single-agency-head model of CFPB,
85

12 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
Id. § 2. The President may remove the Comptroller “upon reason[s] to be
communicated by him to the Senate.” Id. As noted above, the President
“may remove the Director [of CFPB] for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.” Dodd-Frank § 1011(c)(3). Thus, the President is not
limited with respect to the “reasons” he may invoke to remove the
Comptroller. On the other hand, the stated reasons for removal of the CFPB
Director appear to provide broad discretion to the President. See supra note
63 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986)).
87
12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1462a(b)(3).
88
Id. §§ 4511, 4502(20) (establishing FHFA as the agency responsible for
regulating Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs). Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs
are generally referred to as “government-sponsored enterprises” (“GSEs”).
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 31, 133.
89
12 U.S.C. §§ 4512(a), 4513(a). The FHFA’s Director receives advice
from the FHFA’s Oversight Board “with respect to overall strategies and
policies,” but the Oversight Board “may not exercise any executive
authority” over the FHFA. Id. § 4513a(a), (b).
90
Id. § 4512(b). In contrast to the stipulated reasons for removal of the
CFPB’s Director, the grounds representing “cause” for removal of the
FHFA's Director are not specified in the governing statute. Compare DoddFrank § 1011(c)(3) (providing that “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office” are permissible reasons for removing the CFPB's
Director), with 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b)(2) (providing that the FHFA's Director
may be removed “for cause” without further specification).
86
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OCC and FHFA, the FDIC and FRB are administered by multimember boards.91
All five of the foregoing financial regulators have substantial
budgetary autonomy. OCC, FDIC, and FHFA fund their operations
primarily by collecting fees and assessments from the institutions
they regulate.92 FRB finances its operations from the earnings
generated by its large portfolio of government securities and other
investments.93 Thus, each of those four agencies is completely
independent of congressional appropriations. In contrast, CFPB has
substantial but not complete budgetary autonomy. As explained
above, the independent funding that CFPB receives from FRB is
capped at approximately $500 million, adjusted for future inflation,
and CFPB is required to seek a congressional appropriation if it
wishes to increase its budget beyond that amount.
In some areas, CFPB’s regulatory powers are less extensive
than those of FHFA and federal bank regulators. For example, FHFA
may serve as conservator or receiver of any of its regulated entities.94
FHFA has served as conservator for Fannie and Freddie since
September 2008.95 FDIC has similar authority to act as conservator
or receiver for any FDIC-insured national or state bank,96 or as
receiver for any financial company whose failure “would have
serious effects on financial stability in the United States.”97 CFPB
91

CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-63. Two other federal
financial regulators – CFTC and SEC – are similarly administered by
multimember commissions. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 1.3[1], at 27, § 22.7[1], at 752 n.28 (6th ed. 2009).
92
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-63, 314-18; FEDERAL
HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 2010, at 106 (2010)
[hereinafter FHFA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.fhfa.
gov/webfiles/21572/FHFA2010_RepToCongress6_13_11.pdf.
93
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62.
94
12 U.S.C. § 4617 (2006).
95
FHFA was appointed as conservator of Fannie and Freddie on September
6, 2008, and it has continued to administer those conservatorships since that
time. FHFA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 92, at 1-8.
96
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 700-01; 12 U.S.C. §
1821(c).
97
Dodd-Frank §§ 203(b), 204; see also H.R. Rep. No. 111-517, at 865-66
(2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 (explaining
that Title II of Dodd-Frank authorizes the Treasury Secretary to appoint
FDIC as receiver of a financial company in order to “mitigate serious
adverse effects on financial stability in the United States”).
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does not have authority to act as conservator or receiver for any
provider of consumer financial services.
OCC exercises extensive supervisory powers over the
structure and governance of national banks, including the authority to
approve or deny applications for new charters, changes in the
location of main offices and branches, opening of new branches,
conversions into state banks, and mergers and consolidations with
other depository institutions.98 CFPB does not possess comparable
supervisory powers over providers of consumer financial services.
Unlike CFPB, OCC is a “safety and soundness” regulator, and OCC
therefore has prudential authority to regulate national banks with
regard to such matters as capital adequacy, asset quality, competence
and integrity of management, and adequacy of liquidity.99 FDIC and
FRB have similar powers to regulate the safety and soundness of
state banks and bank holding companies.100 Likewise, FHFA has
broad authority to supervise the capital, assets, and liabilities of
Fannie, Freddie and the FHLBs for the purpose of promoting their
safety and soundness.101
In other respects, CFPB’s powers are similar to those of
other financial regulators. CFPB, OCC, FDIC, FHFA and FRB all
have authority to examine financial service providers subject to their
respective jurisdictions in order to ensure compliance with applicable
laws and regulations.102 All five regulators also have comprehensive
98

See 12 U.S.C. §§ 26, 27, 30, 36, 214, 214a, 215, 215a, 215a-1, 1828(c),
1831u (2006) (outlining OCC’s powers over the structure and governance of
national banks); see also CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 7376, 86-89,191-95 (discussing OCC’s powers over national banks).
99
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-62, 251-53, 279-93,
627-35; Levitin, supra note 10, at 155-58.
100
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62-63, 251- 53, 279-93,
455-59, 627-35.
101
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4611-4618, 4622-4624 (2010); see, e.g., id. § 4611(a)(1)
(mandating that the FHFA’s Director must “establish risk-based capital
requirements for [Fannie and Freddie] to ensure that [Fannie and Freddie]
operate in a safe and sound manner”); id. § 4624(a) (requiring the FHFA’s
Director to “establish criteria governing the portfolio holdings of [Fannie
and Freddie], to ensure that the holdings are backed by sufficient capital and
consistent with the mission and the safe and sound operations of [Fannie
and Freddie]”).
102
For examination powers granted to OCC, FRB, FDIC and FHFA, see 12
U.S.C. §§ 481, 483, 1820, 1844(c), 4517 (2006). For the CFPB Director’s
powers to conduct examinations of nondepository providers of consumer
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enforcement powers, including the authority to issue administrative
cease-and-desist orders and civil money penalty orders.103 However,
unlike the other four agencies, CFPB does not have authority to
remove or suspend officers and directors of the companies it
regulates.104
C.

Significant Statutory Limits on CFPB’s Powers

As noted above, CFPB has broadly-defined powers to
regulate providers of consumer financial services.105 However, Title
X of Dodd-Frank imposes several significant limitations on the
exercise of those powers. CFPB may not impose any usury limit on
consumer credit transactions “unless explicitly authorized by law.”106
Moreover, before it issues any regulation, CFPB must analyze “the
potential benefits and costs to consumers and covered [providers of
consumer financial services], including the potential reduction of
access by consumers to consumer financial products or services
resulting from such rule.”107 In particular, CFPB must assess the
impact of any proposed rule on consumers in rural areas and
depository institutions with assets of less than $10 billion.108 CFPB
financial services and large depository institutions with more than $10
billion in assets, see Dodd-Frank §§ 1024(b), 1025(a).
103
For the authority of OCC, FRB and FDIC to issue administrative ceaseand-desist orders and civil money penalty orders, see 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b),
1818(c), 1818(i). For FHFA’s power to issue such orders, see id. §§ 4581,
4585, 4631, 4632, 4636. For CFPB’s authority to issue such orders, see
Dodd-Frank §§ 1053, 1055. Unlike the FHFA, FRB and OCC, the FDIC
and CFPB may also file court actions to obtain civil remedies against
persons subject to their regulation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a)(Fourth)
(outlining FDIC’s authority to file court suits); Dodd-Frank § 1054
(outlining CFPB’s litigation authority). All five agencies may file judicial
actions to enforce their administrative orders. See Dodd-Frank § 1053(d)
(describing CFPB’s power to seek judicial enforcement of administrative
orders); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i) (granting similar authority to FDIC, FRB and
OCC); id. § 4635 (granting similar authority to FHFA).
104
For the authority of OCC, FRB and FDIC to issue orders removing or
suspending officers and directors of regulated institutions, see 12 U.S.C. §
1818(e), 1818(g). For FHFA’s power to issue such orders, see id. § 4636a.
105
See supra notes 59-81 and accompanying text (outlining CFPB powers to
regulate providers of consumer financial services).
106
Dodd-Frank §1027(o).
107
Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(i).
108
Id. § 1022(b)(2)(A)(ii).
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must also consider (i) any expected increase in the cost of credit for
small businesses that would result from the proposed rule, (ii) any
alternatives that would accomplish CFPB’s statutory objectives and
minimize any such increase in cost, and (iii) the advice and
recommendations that CFPB’s small business advisory panel
submitted with regard to the proposed rule.109
Thus, CFPB must take due account of the likely costs and
benefits of each new rule, and it must evaluate the impact of each
rule on consumers, providers of consumer financial services and
small businesses. Title X’s requirement of a cost-benefit analysis for
each new regulation makes CFPB’s rulemakings more vulnerable to
judicial challenges and therefore encourages CFPB to adopt
incremental rather than far-reaching rules.110
Title X also imposes tight restrictions on CFPB’s UDAAP
authority. CFPB may not issue a rule or order declaring an act or
practice to be “unfair” unless the agency has a “reasonable basis to
conclude” that (1) the act or practice is likely to cause a “substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers” and (2) that injury is “not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.”111 Similarly, CFPB may
not issue a rule or order declaring an act or practice to be “abusive”
unless the act or practice either (a) “materially interferes” with a
consumer’s ability to understand a financial product or service, or (b)
“takes unreasonable advantage” of (i) a consumer’s lack of
understanding of “the material risks, costs, or conditions” of the
product or service, or (ii) the consumer’s inability to protect his or
her interests in selecting or using that product or service, or (iii) the
consumer’s reasonable reliance on the provider of that product or
service.112
Title X allows other federal financial regulators to exert
significant influence over CFPB’s regulations. CFPB may not adopt
any rule (including any UDAAP rule) unless it has previously
consulted with federal banking regulators and other appropriate
109

Id. § 1100G.
See, e.g., Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(striking down SEC’s proxy access rule (Rule 14a-11) because SEC failed
to comply with its statutory obligation to perform an adequate analysis of
the potential costs and benefits of the rule, including the rule’s impact on
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation”).
111
Dodd-Frank § 1031(c).
112
Id. § 1031(d).
110
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federal agencies about the “consistency” of the proposed rule with
“prudential, market, or systemic objectives administered by such
agencies.”113 If any prudential regulator objects in writing to a
proposed CFPB regulation, CFPB must include in its final
rulemaking a description of the regulator’s objection and CFPB’s
response to that objection.114 In addition, any federal agency that is a
member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) may
petition FSOC to veto any regulation issued by CFPB.115 After such a
petition is filed, FSOC’s chairman (the Treasury Secretary) may stay
the effectiveness of the challenged CFPB regulation for up to 90 days
to allow “appropriate consideration of the petition by [FSOC].”116
FSOC may set aside the challenged CFPB regulation, or any
provision thereof, if two-thirds of FSOC’s members determine that
“the regulation or provision would put the safety and soundness of
the United States banking system or the stability of the financial
system of the United States at risk.”117 CFPB is the only federal
financial regulator whose regulations are subject to override by an
appellate body composed of heads of other agencies.118 FSOC’s

113

Id. §§ 1022(b)(2)(B), 1031(e).
Id. § 1022(b)(2)(C).
115
Id. § 1023. FSOC has ten voting members, including the heads of nine
federal financial agencies – the Treasury Department, CFPB, CFTC, FDIC,
FHFA, FRB, National Credit Union Administration, OCC and SEC – and an
independent member with insurance experience. FSOC also includes five
non-voting members – the Directors of the Federal Insurance Office and the
Office of Financial Research, as well as three state officials responsible for
regulating banks, insurance companies and securities firms. Id. § 111(b).
116
Id. § 1023(c)(1).
117
Id. § 1023(a), (c)(3). Only an “agency represented by a member of
[FSOC]” may file a petition to stay or set aside a CFPB regulation. Id. §
1023(b)(1). It is not entirely clear from the text of section 1023 whether
members of FSOC that are considered nonvoting members under section
111 are nevertheless entitled to vote on petitions to set aside CFPB
regulations under section 1023.
118
Enhanced Consumer Financial Protection After the Financial Crisis:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th
Cong. at 8 (2011) [hereinafter Levitin Testimony] (written testimony of
Prof. Adam J. Levitin), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=1980c90b
-c8f9-4278-b509-d9de43e8506a&Witness_ID=74b14ea1-b0e7-40f5-8d1c5de7aea00e5a.
114
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potential veto provides “an unusually strong check on CFPB
rulemaking.”119
As noted above, Title X requires CFPB to consult with
federal prudential regulators before issuing any regulation.120
Accordingly, CFPB would have a strong incentive not to “risk a[n]
FSOC rebuke” by adopting a regulation that had provoked a strong
objection from another federal regulator during the consultative
process.121 It appears that CFPB’s supporters included FSOC’s veto
power in Title X in order to blunt claims by CFPB’s opponents that
the bureau’s rules could potentially threaten the safety and soundness
of the banking industry and the stability of the financial system.122
Title X also subjects CFPB to significant oversight by the
executive and legislative branches. CFPB must submit semi-annual
reports to the President and Congress, and CFPB’s Director must
testify about those reports at semi-annual hearings before the
responsible congressional committees.123 In addition, CFPB’s
financial operations are audited each year by the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”), and the audit results are reported to
Congress.124 None of the other federal bank regulators is subject to
an annual audit by GAO.125 Thus, while CFPB’s powers are
undeniably broad, the agency is constrained by significant statutory
limitations, “includ[ing] some unique requirements that other
banking regulators do not face. . . .”126

119

Id.
See supra notes 113-116 and accompanying text.
121
Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 8.
122
The Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank explained that the FSOC’s
veto “is designed to ensure that [CFPB’s] consumer protection regulations
do not put the safety and soundness of the banking system or the stability of
the financial system at risk.” S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010). However,
the report added, “The Committee notes that there was no evidence
provided during its hearings that consumer protection regulation would put
safety and soundness at risk. To the contrary, there has been significant
evidence and extensive testimony that the opposite was the case.” Id.
123
Dodd-Frank § 1016.
124
Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 8 (citing Dodd-Frank §
1017(a)(5)).
125
Id.; Kate Davidson, Four Big Myths About CFPB and Its Powers, AM.
BANKER, June 3, 2011, at 1.
126
Davidson, supra note 125.
120
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CFPB’s Opponents Are Motivated by the
Bureau’s Consumer Protection Mission, Not Its
Structure

As shown above, CFPB’s powers, governance and funding
are comparable to those of two other federal financial regulators—
OCC and FHFA.127 Yet the financial services industry and its
legislative allies have strongly championed the single leadership
governance model and funding arrangements for OCC and FHFA
while condemning CFPB’s similar features. The marked contrast
between the financial industry’s attacks on CFPB and its support for
OCC and FHFA reveal that the industry’s true reason for opposing
CFPB is its consumer protection mandate, not its structure.
OCC is widely viewed as the most committed regulatory
champion for the interests of major banks.128 All of the largest banks
operate under national charters, and assessments paid by national
banks fund virtually all of OCC’s budget. Understandably, given its
strong budgetary incentives, OCC has competed strenuously with
FRB, FDIC and state regulators to attract and retain the allegiance of
large banks.129 During the past three decades, OCC aggressively
127

See supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text (discussing similarities
among CFPB, OCC and FHFA).
128
See, e.g., Simon Johnson, When Regulators Side With the Industries They
Regulate, ECONOMIX
(May 19, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://economix.
blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/when-regulators-side-with-the-industrythey-regulate (“Over the last decade, [OCC] repeatedly demonstrated that it
was very much on the side of banks.”); Stacy Mitchell, Why Republicans
Hate Warren’s CFPB But Love Another Bank Regulator, HUFFINGTON
POST, (Mar. 18, 2011, 10:32 AM), http://www. huffingtonpost.com/stacymitchell/why-republicans-hate-warr_b_837539.html
(“The
difference
between [CFPB and OCC] is that the OCC sees its mission as protecting,
not consumers, but big banks. . . . [OCC] has spent much of the last two
decades preempting state laws that big banks don’t like.”); Joe Nocera,
Letting the Banks Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2011, at A25 (“The
O.C.C. is a coddler, a protector, an outright enabler of the institutions it
oversees. . . . It has consistently defended the Too Big to Fail banks.”);
Steven Pearlstein, The Big Banks’ Best Friend in Washington, WASH. POST,
May 27, 2009, at A12 (“[T]he too-big-to-fail crowd has found an
unapologetic advocate in John Dugan, the comptroller of the currency.”).
129
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra
note 10, at 91-95; Levitin, supra note 10, at 152-58; Wilmarth, supra note
52, at 259-65, 274-79, 296-97.
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preempted state consumer protection laws and adopted “light touch”
regulatory policies that helped national banks to build leading
positions in consumer lending markets for residential mortgages and
credit cards.130 OCC also issued dozens of rulings that greatly
expanded the permissible activities of national banks in areas such as
data processing, derivatives, equipment leasing, insurance sales, real
estate investments and securities activities.131 During the legislative
and regulatory deliberations over Dodd-Frank and other responses to
the financial crisis, OCC strongly opposed a wide variety of reforms,
including reforms that would (i) allow the states to give greater
protections to consumers who buy products and services from
national banks, (ii) provide improved safeguards for credit card
customers, (iii) require national banks to retain a substantial portion
of the risk of loans they sell for securitization, and (iv) impose tighter
restrictions on compensation for bank executives. In each case, OCC
adopted an anti-reform position that was strongly aligned with major
banks and their trade associations.132
Following the enactment of Dodd-Frank, OCC continued to
support anti-reform sentiments expressed by major banks. For
130

See authorities cited supra in note 1259; see also ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 10, at 164-73; Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 910-19; Wilmarth,
supra note 52, at 348-56.
131
See CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 115-27, 134-36, 15358 (discussing OCC rulings related to data processing, equipment leasing,
insurance sales and securities activities); Michael S. Edwards, OCC
Interprets The National Bank Act to Permit Banks to Own Hotels and
Windmills, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 435 (2007) (describing OCC rulings that
broadened the real estate investment powers of national banks); Saule T.
Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
“Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) (reviewing OCC
rulings that expanded permissible derivatives activities for national banks).
132
See, e.g., Joe Adler, Trade Group Backs Dugan Stand, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 11, 2010, at 2 (“A securitization trade group . . . applauded recent
remarks by Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan calling into question
‘skin-in-the-game’ risk-retention proposals.”); Andrew Martin, Does This
Bank Watchdog Have a Bite?, N.Y. TIMES , Mar. 28, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/business/28dugan.html?pagewanted=a
ll (reporting on OCC’s opposition to provisions of Dodd-Frank that would
increase the applicability of state consumer protection laws to national
banks); Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Cards and Reluctant Regulators, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/business/
17gret.html?pagewanted=all (reporting on OCC’s opposition to stricter
regulations for credit cards and executive compensation).
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example, Acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh called for
“modest” increases in capital requirements for systemically
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”), while other federal
regulators advocated significantly higher capital surcharges for
SIFIs.133 Mr. Walsh also questioned the desirability of other reforms
mandated by Dodd-Frank, including the “Volcker rule” that restricts
bank trading activities.134 In a speech delivered on June 21, 2011, Mr.
Walsh warned that “in the frenzy of the moment, we can overreact in
response to crisis. . . . [W]e are in danger of trying to squeeze too
much risk and complexity out of banking. . . .”135 One news report
observed that Mr. Walsh “voiced the frustrations of many bankers”
about Dodd-Frank.136
Mr. Walsh and OCC created additional controversy by
issuing regulations that preserved most of the sweeping preemption
133

Donna Borak, OCC’s Walsh Signals U.S. Split Over SIFI Charge, AM.
BANKER, June 21, 2011, at 1 (reporting that Mr. Walsh and OCC favored a
“modest” capital surcharge for SIFIs, while other regulators, including
FDIC chairman Sheila Bair, supported a much higher capital surcharge for
SIFIs).
134
Binyamin Appelbaum, Dodd-Frank Backers Clash with Regulator, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2011, at B1 (reporting that, under Mr. Walsh’s direction,
OCC “is seeking to soften a wide range of [Dodd-Frank’s] provisions, in
areas ranging from the bread-and-butter of consumer protection to the
esoteric details of how much money banks can borrow.”); Lindsey White,
OCC’s Walsh criticizes ‘Volcker rule,’ Basel III capital rules, SNL EUR.
FIN. DAILY, June 23, 2011 (available on Lexis) (reporting that Mr. Walsh
“has taken aim at the ‘Volcker rule’ and Basel III capital requirements,
suggesting that regulators are overreacting to the abuses of the financial
crisis”); Dave Clarke & Jonathan Spicer, Regulators split on hedging under
Vocker rule, REUTERS, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/09/21/us-financial-regulation-volckeridUSTRE78K42R20110921 (reporting that OCC “has pushed to give banks
more leeway” in their trading operations by championing a broader
interpretation of permissible hedging activities under Dodd-Frank’s
“Volcker rule,” while FDIC, CFTC and SEC “have advocated for a tighter
interpretation of the law”). For a discussion of debates over the enactment
and implementation of the Volcker rule, see Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail
Problem, supra note 57, at 1025-30.
135
John Walsh, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (June 21, 2011), at 3, available
at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2011/pub-speech2011-78.pdf.
136
Appelbaum, supra note 134.
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rules that OCC had issued in 2004.137 National banks and their trade
associations warmly endorsed the OCC’s revised preemption
regulations.138 However, the OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking
for those regulations provoked an unusual public rebuke from
Treasury Department General Counsel George Madison. Mr.
Madison criticized OCC’s proposed regulations for (i) adopting a
preemption standard that was more favorable to national banks than
the standard mandated by Dodd-Frank, and (ii) advocating the
retention of most of the OCC’s 2004 blanket preemption rules.139
Democratic members of Congress strongly criticized Mr. Walsh, and
President Obama nominated Thomas Curry, a member of FDIC’s

137

For discussions of OCC’s issuance of revised regulations that preserved
most of the broad-scale preemption rules that OCC adopted in 2004, see
Rob Blackwell, “New” OCC Standard Feels Very Familiar, AM. BANKER,
May 16, 2011, at 1; R. Christian Bruce, Preemption: Experts Debate Impact
on OCC Powers If Preemption Proposal Is Pushed Back, 97 BNA’S
BANKING REP. 57 (July 12, 2011); R. Christian Bruce, Preemption: OCC
Finalizes Preemption Rule But Leaves Room for Backtracking, 97 BNA’S
BANKING REP. 157 (July 26, 2011) [hereinafter Bruce, “OCC Preemption
Rule”]. The OCC’s revised preemption regulations are published at Office
of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43549 (July 21, 2011).
138
See Blackwell, supra note 137 (reporting that “banking industry
representatives,” including the Financial Services Roundtable, endorsed the
OCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking); Bruce, “OCC Preemption Rule,”
supra note 137 (reporting that “[n]ational banks cheered the [OCC’s final]
rules,” as did the American Bankers Association); Louise Story, DoddFrank Rekindles Old Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2011, at B1 (reporting
that Citibank, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo and the Clearing House
Association supported OCC’s proposed rules).
139
Kate Davidson, Treasury Sharply Criticizes OCC’s Preemption
Proposal, AM. BANKER, June 29, 2011, at 1; see also Binyamin Appelbaum,
Official from F.D.I.C. Picked to Lead Banking Regulator, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2011, at B3 (reporting that “the Treasury Department took the
unprecedented step of submitting a public comment to the [OCC] criticizing
its [preemption] proposal for ignoring [Dodd-Frank’s] intent”). I have
previously argued that Dodd-Frank requires OCC to rescind all of its 2004
blanket preemption rules. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 926-41; Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., VIEWPOINT: OCC’s Walsh Gets It Wrong on Preemption,
AM. BANKER, May 19, 2011, at 9; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., OCC Gets It
Wrong on Preemption, Again, AM. BANKER, July 29, 2011, at 8.
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Board of Directors, to become Comptroller of the Currency in place
of Mr. Walsh.140
Republican members of Congress expressed great concern
that the Treasury Department’s public criticism of the OCC’s
preemption proposal might undermine the OCC’s policymaking
independence. As noted above, OCC’s autonomy is protected against
interference by the Treasury Department in the same way that
CFPB’s independence is shielded against infringement by the
FRB.141 In July 2011, Representative Randy Neugebauer (R-TX)
launched an investigation of the Treasury Department’s decision to
submit a public comment letter criticizing the OCC’s preemption
proposal.142 He declared that the comment letter “prompted concerns
regarding the Treasury Department’s influence on OCC rulemaking,”
and he requested “assurances that the Treasury has permitted the
OCC to act independently in the rulemaking for this and all
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act.”143 A few weeks later, Senator
Shelby expressed similar concerns about Treasury’s comment letter
during the Senate Banking Committee’s hearing on Mr. Curry’s
nomination for appointment as Comptroller.144
As a matter of principle, the emphatic defense of OCC’s
autonomy by Representative Neugebauer and Senator Shelby seems
at odds with their insistence on stringent external controls over
CFPB’s budget and rulemaking.145 Their diametrically opposed
140

Appelbaum, supra note 134; Appelbaum, supra note 139; Meera Louis,
Dodd-Frank May Be Subject of Confirmation Hearing for U.S. Bank
Regulators, BLOOMBERG, July 26, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-07-26/fdic-occ-nominees-to-face-dodd-frank-queries-fromsenate-panel.html; Kevin Wack, Curry Answers Preemption Questions, AM.
BANKER, July 27, 2011, at 3.
141
See supra notes 77-78, 87 and accompanying text.
142
R. Christian Bruce, Preemption: Neugebauer Seeks Records from
Treasury, Cites Worries About Interference with OCC, 97 BNA’S BANKING
REP. 67 (July 12, 2011).
143
Id. (quoting letter from Rep. Neugebauer to Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner).
144
Wack, supra note 140.
145
See Mike Ferullo, Regulatory Reform: Neugebauer Bill Would Allow
Congress to Control Purse Strings of Consumer Agency, 96 BNA’S
BANKING REPORT 285 (Feb. 15, 2011) (describing Representative
Neugebauer’s demands for congressional control over CFPB’s budget); Phil
Mattingly & Carter Dougherty, U.S. Consumer Bureau Funding Would
Drop 40 Percent Under Republican Plan, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2011, 5:16

2011-2012

MISGUIDED QUEST TO UNDERMINE THE CFPB

917

attitudes toward OCC and CFPB indicate that Republican leaders are
“less concerned about the structural independence of federal financial
regulatory agencies and . . . more concerned about whether those
agencies issue regulations that support the interests of our largest
financial institutions.”146
One finds the same incongruity in the decade-long campaign
by major banks and their legislative allies to create a strong
independent regulator for Fannie and Freddie. That campaign
culminated in Congress’ passage of a statute establishing FHFA in
2008.147 From 1999 to 2008, a coalition of large lenders and their
trade associations (known first as “FM Watch” and later as “FM
Policy Focus”) lobbied for legislation to rein in Fannie and Freddie.
That coalition—which included the Financial Services Roundtable,
the Consumer Bankers Association, Bank of America, JP Morgan
Chase and Wells Fargo—raised a number of valid points, such as the
systemic risks posed by Fannie and Freddie, their implicit
government subsidies, their inadequate capital, and the weak
supervisory powers granted to their existing regulator, the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (“OFHEO”). However,
coalition members also had a clear self-interest—namely, to remove
or weaken Fannie and Freddie as competitors in markets for
originating and securitizing residential mortgages. The lobbyists and

PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-15/house-republicanstarget-consumer-protection-bureau-funding-in-budget-bill.html
(“Neugebauer . . . has introduced legislation that would move the CFPB into the
Treasury Department from the Fed, a step that would make it subject to the
congressional appropriations process.”) ; U.S. Fed. News, Rep., Neugebauer
Issues Statement on Bringing Oversight and Accountability to the Consumer
Financial Protection Board [sic], (Feb. 10, 2011) (available on Lexis)
(“Given the significant and perhaps over-regulating powers the CFPB has
been given by the Obama Administration, Congress must have a say on the
appropriation of taxpayer money funding this agency's operation.”); Shelby,
supra note 37, at 1 (explaining in a Wall Street Journal op-ed why Congress
should have extensive oversight powers with respect to CFPB).
146
Bruce, “OCC Preemption Rule,” supra note 137, at 57-58 (quoting my
comments); see also Mattingly & Dougherty, supra note 145, at 2 (quoting
Rep. Brad Miller, D-NC, who maintained that “[t]he financial industry
always hated [CFPB] . . . [a]nd in my experience in Congress, what the
financial industry wants, Republicans are usually perfectly willing to do”).
147
Kate Davidson, Question of Hypocrisy in GOP Assault on the CFPB,
176 AM. BANKER 43, Mar. 21, 2011, at 1.
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legislative allies for FM Watch and FM Policy Focus were mainly
Republicans.148
As noted above, FHFA is similar to CFPB because it has a
single-Director governance model and does not depend on
congressional appropriations for its funding.149 Major banks and their
congressional allies helped to pass legislation ensuring that FHFA
would be “a strong, independent regulator” with a secure funding
source, thereby protecting FHFA against the threat of capture by
Fannie and Freddie.150 The obvious inconsistency between the
148

For descriptions of the lobbying campaign by FM Watch and FM Policy
Focus, see Charles R. Babcock, Mortgage Giants Stir Congress, WASH.
POST, June 11, 2003, at E01 (“Rival banking and insurance companies have
focused more on what they consider the companies' unfair advantage in
cheaper financing stemming from their government ties.”); Jeffrey H.
Birnbaum, Editorial, The Man Behind the Byline Isn’t Behind the Article.
So, Who Is?, WASH. POST, July 29, 2008, at A15 (“[T]he wide-ranging
housing rescue bill was a victory for a coalition of banks and mortgage
insurers that has been fighting for nearly a decade to rein in the mortgage
finance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”); Stephanie Fitch & Erin
Killian, Freddie’s Enemies, FORBES, July 7, 2003, at 50 (“FM Watch . . .
[was] [f]ounded in 1999 with the idea of keeping Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae honest.”); Ed Roberts, Competitors Want Fannie, Freddie Out of Their
Business, 7 CREDIT UNION J. 24, June 16, 2003, at 1 (“FM Watch has been
lobbying Congress for the past few years to rein in the so-called mission
creep of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae . . .”); Opponents Reload for Fight
with the GSEs, 8 CREDIT UNION J. 50, Dec. 13, 2004, at 12 (explaining how
FM Watch hired new lobbyists to strengthen its fight for stronger regulation
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac); Jeanne Cummings, Regulation comes to
those who wait, POLITICO.COM (July 9, 2007, 7:41 PM),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0707/4835.html (“For nearly eight
years, the organization of bankers, consumer advocates and financial houses
has been pushing for greater scrutiny of mortgage lending giants Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.”).
149
See supra notes 79-81, 92-93 and accompanying text (explaining that
CFPB’s financial autonomy is not as extensive as FHFA’s budgetary
independence, because CFPB is assured of receiving approximately $500
million of funding from FRB but would be required to request a
congressional appropriation in order to obtain supplemental funding).
150
H.R. REP. NO. 110-142, at 87 (2007); see also Davidson, supra note 147,
at 1 (“[Barney] Frank said, ‘I think you've seen that with my Republican
colleagues: many of them liked OFHEO, so they wanted it insulated, and
they don't like CFPB, so they want to subject it to further controls.’”); supra
note 148, infra notes 302-08 and accompanying text (explaining that a top
priority of FHFA’s supporters was to insulate FHFA from political capture
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banking industry’s support for FHFA and its vehement opposition to
CFPB provides further evidence that attacks on CFPB’s structure
“are not born from a matter of principle, but just because [opponents]
don’t like the CFPB.”151
IV.

The Changes to CFPB Demanded by the Financial
Services Industry and Its Legislative Allies Would Seriously
Impair CFPB’s Independence and Effectiveness

As described above, the financial services industry has
enthusiastically supported demands by Republican congressional
leaders for fundamental changes in CFPB’s governance, powers and
funding. Republican-backed legislation would establish a
multimember board to govern CFPB, would increase the ability of
prudential regulators to veto CFPB’s rules on “safety and soundness”
grounds, and would require CFPB to obtain its funding through
congressional appropriations.152 As shown below, each of those
modifications would significantly impair CFPB’s ability to fulfill its
statutory mission.
A.

CFPB’s Director Should Not Be Replaced by a
Multimember Commission

House Republicans passed legislation on July 21, 2011, that
would create a five-member commission to administer CFPB in
place of a single Director.153 As Adam Levitin has observed, “[t]he
scholarly literature on agency design has not achieved any
consensus” as to whether single agency heads are superior or inferior
to multimember commissions.154 Administrative law scholars have
generally described the two agency structures as offering relatively
equal “trade-offs” between (1) greater “efficiency and
accountability” within agencies administered by single officials and
(2) increased “deliberation and debate” and “compromise” within

by giving FHFA a secure funding source that would not be subject to
congressional control).
151
Davidson, supra note 147, at 1 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank).
152
See supra notes 310-35 and accompanying text.
153
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing House passage
of H.R. 1315).
154
Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 9.
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multimember commissions.155 In contrast, a 1987 evaluation of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) by the General
Accounting Office (“GAO”) concluded that the superior
administrative effectiveness of a single-director structure would
outweigh any potential benefits of collegial decision-making within
CPSC’s multimember commission.156
CPSC was “the inspiration” for CFPB’s creation.157 When
Congress enacted legislation establishing CPSC in 1972, the
agency’s proponents sought to create a powerful agency with a broad
mandate to protect consumers from dangerous products.158 Consumer
groups also supported the creation of a five-member commission for
CPSC as a means of promoting wider expertise and political
independence.159 However, CPSC is now “widely regarded as one of
the least politically independent and influential agencies in
government.”160
Commentators have identified several reasons for CPSC’s
lackluster record in protecting consumers, including its lack of a
secure funding source.161 GAO concluded in 1987 that CPSC’s
155

Barkow, supra note 7, at 37-38; see also Levitin Testimony, supra note
118, at 9.
156
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-HRD-87-14, TESTIMONY:
ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION 2-6 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 GAO-CPSC Report] (explaining
that some CPSC officials supported the agency’s multimember commission
structure because it encouraged an “exchange of ideas, and a mix of
perspectives . . . including diversity of background, areas of expertise, and
political considerations . . .” while others criticized CPSC’s commission
structure for creating serious administrative problems; based on GAO's
review of “[a] number of studies, such as those by the Hoover Commission
and the Ash Council . . . over the past 50 years on regulatory commissions,”
GAO determined that “[a]ll of the studies we reviewed found some
significant problems with the commission structure” and some studies
“recommended replacing the multimember commissions with agencies
headed by single administrators.”); see also Barkow, supra note 7, at 65-72
(describing CPSC's administrative shortcomings).
157
Barkow, supra note 7, at 72.
158
Id. at 65.
159
Id. at 66.
160
Id. at 71 (noting that “[i]n its first five years, CPSC issued only one
safety standard . . . and only seven safety standards after ten years”).
161
Id. at 67-71 (citing studies documenting CPSC’s lack of effectiveness
and explaining that “[t]he major reason [for CPSC’s ineffectiveness] is that
the CPSC has been chronically underfunded and understaffed”); see also
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multimember commission structure was ineffective and should be
scrapped in favor of a single director.162 GAO found that CPSC’s
leadership lacked stability and direction due to “high turnover” in the
commission’s membership, squabbles among commissioners over
resources, and delays in decision-making.163 GAO reported that
“[s]even of the eight other health and safety regulatory agencies . . .
have single administrators,” and the unified leadership structure of
those agencies appeared to “enhance the decision-making
process.”164 However, Congress did not adopt GAO’s
recommendation to replace CPSC’s multimember commission with a
single administrator.165
Thus, the factors of efficiency, stability, decisiveness and
accountability argue in favor of retaining CFPB’s single-Director
model of governance. Creating a five-member commission would
likely produce more delay and less consistency in CFPB’s decisionmaking. Moreover, a five-member commission would expose CFPB
to the risk of leadership deadlock whenever a commissioner left
office.166 This threat of institutional paralysis would be heightened
if—as provided in the recently passed House bill—no more than
three members of the commission could be affiliated with the same
political party.167 Under that structure, the departure of any member

infra note 293 and accompanying text (discussing CPSC’s vulnerability to
political influence due to its reliance on congressional appropriations for
funding).
162
1987 GAO-CPSC Report, supra note 156, at 1.
163
Id. at 2.
164
Id. at 5
165
Id. at 6; see also Barkow, supra note 7, at 71 & n.319 (explaining the
GAO’s single administrator recommendation and Congress’s decision to not
change the CFPC structure).
166
In contrast, CFPB’s Deputy Director (when appointed by the Director)
would have authority to “serve as acting Director in the absence or
unavailability of the Director.” Dodd-Frank § 1011(b)(5).
167
Ferullo, supra note 30 (describing H.R. 1315 as passed by the House of
Representatives on July 21, 2011 which would result in “five
commissioners . . . with no more than three of them allowed to be members
of the same political party.”); Carter Dougherty & Phil Mattingly, Warren
Says Proposed Consumer Bureau Changes Would Aid Banks, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 8, 2011, 6:53 PM) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-0408/warren-says-proposed-consumer-bureau-changes-would-benefitbanks.html (discussing the proposal by House Republicans “to replace the
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of the majority would likely produce a commission that was evenly
divided on a wide range of policy issues. During the past three
decades, the lengthy vetting process for Presidential nominees and
prolonged Senate confirmation battles have frequently resulted in
persistent vacancies and policy deadlocks at agencies with
multimember commissions.168
The financial services industry and House Republican
leaders appear to recognize the potential shortcomings of
multimember commissions, at least for the financial regulatory
agencies they support. The industry and its legislative allies have not
attempted to establish multimember commissions to replace the
single-administrator governance structures at OCC and FHFA.
Indeed, the Republican leadership summarily rejected such a
proposal during a recent House subcommittee vote on legislation to
change CFPB’s structure. Representative Brad Miller (D-NC)
introduced an amendment that would have authorized a multimember
commission for OCC as well as CFPB, but his amendment was ruled
“not germane” and out of order by Representative Shelley Moore
Capito (R-WV), the subcommittee’s chair.169 It is not intuitively
obvious why Representative Miller’s OCC amendment was “not
CFPB director position created by the Dodd-Frank Act with a five-person
commission”).
168
See Robert Douglas Brownstone, The National Labor Relations Board at
50: Politicization Creates Crisis, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 268-69 & 269
n.188 (1986) (reporting that, during 1983-84, “more than 20 decisions were
stalled because they were deadlocked at 2-2 and the [National Labor
Relations] Board did not have a fifth member”); Carol Skrzycki, Top
Regulatory Posts Remain Unfilled: Dozens of Federal Jobs Are Vacant as
Politics Bog Down Appointment Process, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1997, at
A01 (reporting that 46 positions were vacant on “boards and commissions
of independent regulatory agencies that require Senate confirmation,”
resulting in policy deadlocks at some agencies); John M. Broder, Tie Vote
Blocks F.C.C. Inquiry On Liquor Ads, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1997, at A20
(reporting that a vacancy on the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) produced a 2-2 vote that prevented the FCC from proceeding with
an investigation of liquor advertising); see also FTC Still Split On
Microsoft: No Antitrust Ruling Issued, But Firm Says Probe Is Continuing,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 22, 1993, at A1 (reporting that recusal
of a commissioner produced a 2-2 vote that prevented the FTC from issuing
an antitrust complaint against Microsoft).
169
Kate Davidson, Subcommittee Approves Bills to Revamp CFPB, 176 AM.
BANKER 70, May 5, 2011, at 3.
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germane” if Republicans were truly seeking to establish an important
principle of administrative law by changing CFPB’s governance
structure to a multimember commission.
As noted above, a leading argument in favor of the
multimember commission governance structure is that it encourages
the agency to consider views from persons with a variety of
backgrounds and perspectives.170 However, Dodd-Frank already
requires CFPB’s Director to consult with a wide range of outside
parties before making major policy decisions. First, the Director must
seek advice from CFPB’s Consumer Advisory Board, whose
members will represent many different perspectives and
backgrounds.171 Second, CFPB must consult with other federal
financial regulators before adopting any regulation, and CFPB must
address any objections raised by those regulators in its notice of final
rulemaking.172 In particular, CFPB must take into account the
“consistency” of each proposed regulation with “prudential, market,
or systemic objectives administered by such agencies.”173 Third,
CFPB must seek the advice of its small business advisory panel
regarding the impact of any proposed regulation on the cost of credit
for small businesses,174 and CFPB must also consider the effects of
each proposed rule on consumers (especially those in rural areas) and
170

See supra note 1556 (describing arguments made by some CPSC
officials in favor of a multimember commission).
171
Dodd-Frank § 1014(a) (requiring CFPB’s Director to establish a
Consumer Advisory Board that will meet at least twice each year. The
purpose of that Board is “to advise and consult with [CFPB] in the exercise
of its functions under the Federal consumer financial laws, and to provide
information on emerging practices in the consumer financial products or
services industry”); Dodd-Frank § 1014(b) (instructing CFPB's Director, in
selecting the Board's members, to “seek to assemble experts in consumer
protection, financial services, community development, fair lending and
civil rights, and consumer financial products or services,” as well as
representatives of depository institutions that provide services to
underserved communities and communities affected by high-cost
mortgages).
172
See supra notes 113-12014 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s
obligation to consult with other regulators under Dodd-Frank §§ 1022(b)(2),
1031(e)).
173
Dodd-Frank § 1022(b)(2)(B).
174
See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s duty to
seek the recommendations of its small business advisory panel under DoddFrank § 1100G(b)).
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smaller depository institutions.175 Thus, CFPB’s Director is already
obliged to consider the views of many interested parties before
deciding to adopt a regulation. Superimposing a multimember
commission on top of CFPB’s existing decision-making process
would provide few, if any, benefits, and it would impose potentially
significant costs on the bureau and the public.
B.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council Should
Not Be Given an Enhanced Veto Power over
CFPB’s Regulations
1.

The House Legislation Would Enable
Prudential Regulators to Block CFPB’s
Regulations by Invoking “Safety and
Soundness”
Concerns
Affecting
Individual Banks

The Republican-sponsored House bill would greatly
strengthen FSOC’s ability to veto regulations issued by CFPB.176
Currently, under Dodd-Frank, any agency represented on FSOC may
file a petition to set aside a CFPB regulation, and the Treasury
Secretary may stay the rule’s effectiveness for up to 90 days to
facilitate FSOC’s consideration of the petition.177 Dodd-Frank
authorizes FSOC’s members, by a two-thirds vote, to strike down a
CFPB regulation if they determine that the rule “would put the safety
and soundness of the United States banking system or the stability of
the financial system of the United States at risk.”178

175

See supra notes 11007-1120 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s
obligation to perform a cost-benefit analysis for each proposed rule).
176
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing passage of
H.R. 1315 by the House on July 21, 2011).
177
Dodd-Frank § 1023(b)(1)(A), (c) (requiring an agency, before filing a
petition to set aside a regulation issued by CFPB, to attempt “in good faith”
to work with CFPB in resolving the agency’s concerns about the
regulation’s impact on the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system
or the stability of the U.S. financial system).
178
Id. at § 1023(a); see supra notes 115-1167 and accompanying text
(discussing FSOC’s authority to veto a CFPB regulation). As discussed
above, there are ten voting members and five nonvoting members of FSOC.
It is not entirely clear from the text of Section 1023 whether FSOC’s
nonvoting members can vote on whether to set aside a CFPB regulation.
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In contrast, under the House bill, a simple majority of
FSOC’s members could vote to invalidate a CFPB regulation if they
determine that the rule would be inconsistent with the safe and sound
operations of U.S. financial institutions.179 Thus, the House bill
would remove Dodd-Frank’s requirement that a CFPB regulation
must have systemic adverse effects (as opposed to a negative impact
on individual institutions) in order to justify FSOC’s veto. The House
bill would also (i) bar CFPB’s Director from voting on any petition
to set aside a CFPB regulation, and (ii) delete Dodd-Frank’s
requirement that FSOC must act expeditiously on any such
petition.180
Hence, the House bill would enable federal prudential
regulators to veto CFPB’s regulations by claiming that the
challenged rules would impair the “safety and soundness” of
individual financial institutions. The House bill would also permit
the Treasury Secretary to approve indefinite suspensions of CFPB
rules while FSOC considers veto petitions. As a practical matter,
federal prudential regulators would be able to block any CFPB rule if
they believed that the rule would have an adverse impact on one or
more financial institutions that were subjects of regulatory concern.
As shown below, prudential regulators would be likely to exercise
their veto power to protect the interests of their largest regulated
constituents.

179

Bivins, supra note 31.
Id.; Dodd-Frank § 1023(c)(1)(B), (c)(4)(B) (requiring FSOC to act on an
agency’s petition to set aside a CFPB rule within 45 days after the petition is
filed, or within 90 days of that date if the Treasury Secretary has agreed to
stay the rule’s effectiveness).
180
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Prudential Regulators Failed to Protect
Consumers or to Ensure the Safety and
Soundness of Financial Institutions
during the Credit Boom that Led to the
Current Financial Crisis

The House bill is based on the unwarranted assumption that
protecting consumers frequently injures the safety and soundness of
financial institutions. While individual institutions may complain
about particular consumer laws, the current financial crisis has
demonstrated that appropriate consumer protection is essential to
maintain the long-term safety and soundness of our financial
system.181 As the Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank pointed
out, “[t]here was no evidence provided during [the committee’s]
hearings that consumer protection regulation would put safety and
soundness [of banks] at risk. To the contrary, there has been
significant evidence and extensive testimony that the opposite was
the case.”182
The Senate committee report also explained that “the failure
of the federal banking and other regulators to address significant
consumer protection issues” during the subprime lending boom
proved to be “detrimental to both consumers and the safety and
soundness of the banking system.”183 The history of the financial
crisis strongly supports the Senate committee’s view. As I have
described in previous articles, federal regulators allowed large
complex financial institutions (“LCFIs”) to become “the primary
private-sector catalysts for the destructive credit boom that led to the

181

See Levitin, supra note 10, at 152 (“The events of 2007-2008 have also
shown that . . . [c]onsumer protection must be seen as an essential
component of systemic-risk protection. The failure to protect consumers has
systemic externalities.”); Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Consuming Debt:
Structuring the Federal Response to Abuses in Consumer Credit, 18 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 43, 62 (2005) ( “[A] bank that is involved in predatory
lending practices not only harms consumers by charging undisclosed fees,
but also may threaten the bank’s financial condition by systematically
making overly risky loans.”).
182
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 166 (2010) (quoting the views of two senior
former bank regulators – Kevin Jacques and Brad Sabel – who denied the
existence of any conflict between consumer protection and safety and
soundness regulation).
183
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9.
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subprime financial crisis,” and LCFIs became “the epicenter of the
current global financial mess.”184
LCFIs provided most of the funding, directly or indirectly,
for “almost 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans between
2003 and 2007, and by 2008 about $2 trillion of such loans were
outstanding.”185 LCFIs securitized most of those nonprime loans, and
securitization encouraged a steady decline in lending standards
between 2003 and 2006.186 LCFIs believed—mistakenly—that they
could successfully transfer the risks of nonprime loans by bundling
the loans into mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and selling the
MBS to far-flung investors. LCFIs had powerful incentives to
originate (or buy) and securitize nonprime loans because they earned
large fees from securitizing the loans and selling the MBS.187
Thus, LCFIs financed a huge surge in nonprime lending that
helped to generate a massive boom-and-bust cycle in the U.S.
housing market.188 “Housing prices rose rapidly from 2001 to 2005,
stopped rising in 2006, and began to fall sharply in 2007.”189 As I
have previously explained, LCFIs played a central role in this
disastrous credit cycle:
[B]y 2007, the health of the U.S. economy relied on
a massive confidence game—indeed, some might
184

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN.
L. REV. 963, 1046 (2009) [hereinafter Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal
Banking], quoted in Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at
977; see also Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 897-903, 910-19 (describing
regulatory actions that contributed to the failures or government bailouts of
several leading LCFIs).
185
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 897; Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal
Banking, supra note 184, at 1011-12, 1015-20, 1022-24 (showing that (i)
LCFIs were the primary sources of funding, directly or indirectly, for most
nonprime mortgages, (ii) about $3.7 trillion of subprime and Alt-A
mortgages were originated between 2001 and 2006, and (iii) more than half
of the nonprime loans originated between 2003 and 2007 were used to
refinance existing loans).
186
Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 102027; Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 963-67.
187
Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 995,
1025-26; Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 971-72.
188
Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem supra note 57, at 963-66, 970-71.
189
Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 1024.
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say, a Ponzi scheme—operated by its leading
financial institutions. This confidence game, which
sustained the credit boom, could continue only as
long as investors were willing to keep buying new
debt instruments [underwritten by LCFIs] that would
enable overstretched borrowers to expand their
consumption and service their debts. In the summer
of 2007, when investors lost confidence in the ability
of subprime borrowers to meet their obligations, the
game collapsed and a severe financial crisis began.190
The rapid decline in home prices after 2006 triggered an
abrupt shutdown in nonprime lending and cut off refinancing options
for many borrowers.191 Borrowers defaulted on their mortgages in
rapidly increasing numbers, which led to widespread foreclosures.
Lenders foreclosed on five million homes by the end of 2010, and 4
million additional foreclosures are expected to occur in 2011 and
2012.192
Accelerating defaults on home mortgages inflicted major
losses on holders of MBS and other mortgage-related investments.
Cascading losses on mortgage-related investments triggered a flight
by investors from risky assets of all kinds, and that “flight to safety”
unleashed a systemic financial crisis.193 The financial crisis caused
190

Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1019-20, 1024.
192
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 898; see also Nick Timiraos, Home Forecast
Calls for Pain, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011, at A1 (reporting that “[o]ne in
five Americans with a mortgage owes more than their home is worth, and
$7 trillion of homeowners’ equity has been lost in the [housing] bust”).
193
See, e.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the
Run on the Repo 6-21 (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 09-14, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440752 (providing data confirming
that the repo market dried up quickly once losses on MBS became
apparent); Arvind Krishnamurthy, How Debt Markets Have Malfunctioned
in the Crisis, 24 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (2010) (“[losses on MBS]
caused debt markets to break down; indeed, fundamental values and market
values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far
removed from the ‘toxic’ subprime mortgage assets at the root of the
crisis.”); Lasse Heje Pedersen, When Everyone Runs for the Exit, 5 INT’L. J.
ON CENT. BANKING 177, 177-81 (2009) (explaining how investors “ran for
the exits” after recognizing the risks inherent in mortgage-related
investments).
191
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the failures or near-failures of many LCFIs and inflicted severe
distress on the U.S. economy.194 To prevent the onset of a second
Great Depression, the U.S. government spent $800 billion on
economic stimulus and provided more than $6 trillion of assistance
to financial institutions in the form of central bank loans and other
government extensions of credit, guarantees, asset purchases and
capital infusions.195 Notwithstanding these extraordinary measures,
the U.S. economy is still struggling to escape a prolonged period of
slow growth and high unemployment.196
By giving prudential regulators an enhanced veto over
CFPB’s regulations, the House bill would effectively put
responsibility for consumer protection back in the hands of the same
agencies that failed to protect both consumers and our financial
markets during the past decade.197 The Senate committee report on
Dodd-Frank pointed out “the spectacular failure of the prudential
regulators” to protect consumers from predatory nonprime
mortgages.198 As the report explained, regulators failed to crack
down on mortgages with “exploding” adjustable rates and other
abusive features.199 Instead, “regulators ‘routinely sacrificed
consumer protection for short-term profitability of banks’ . . . and
Wall Street investment firms, despite the fact that so many people
were raising the alarm about the problems these loans would
cause.”200 Moreover, OCC and OTS preempted state anti-predatory
lending laws and state enforcement efforts and thereby “actively
194

Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184, at 102735, 1044-46; Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 957-61,
977-81.
195
Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 957-59.
196
Id. at 959-61; Kevin J. Lansing, Gauging the Impact of the Great
Recession, FRBSF ECON. LETTER 2011-21 (July 11, 2011), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2011/el2011-21.html;
Neil Irwin, Flat job figures stoke fears of stalled recovery, WASH. POST,
Sept. 3, 2011, at A1 (reporting that the U.S. economy was continuing to
grow slowly and was hindered by high unemployment).
197
See Bivins, supra note 31 (“It makes no sense to give the same banking
regulators who were asleep at the wheel before the last financial crisis more
power to second guess the CFPB.”) (quoting Pamela Banks, senior policy
counsel for Consumers Union); Davidson & Adler, supra note 30 (quoting a
similar comment by Rep. Barney Frank).
198
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15 (2010).
199
Id.
200
Id. (quoting testimony of Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009).
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created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could
flourish without state controls.”201
Numerous studies have confirmed the Senate committee
report’s findings concerning the shortcomings of federal prudential
regulators.202 For example, FRB had authority under a 1994 federal
statute to adopt rules to prohibit unfair or deceptive lending practices
by all types of mortgage lenders.203 However, notwithstanding
proposals for action by FRB staff members and many others, FRB
failed to promulgate effective regulations until 2008, a year after the
subprime mortgage market collapsed.204 Similarly, FRB declined to
exercise its authority to regulate high-risk mortgage lending by
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies until 2007, again
despite calls for action by FRB staff members and others.205

201

Id. at 16-17.
See, e.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-205 (describing
regulatory failures by FRB, OCC and OTS); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note
10, at 120-32, 141-44 (discussing the shortcomings of federal prudential
regulators); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 10, at 81-95 (same); Levitin,
supra note 10, at 151-69 (explaining the “failure of the current consumerprotection regime in financial services,” id. at 151); Wilmarth, supra note
10, at 897-919 (“Regulatory inaction and preemption by federal banking
agencies played a significant role in allowing abusive nonprime lending to
grow and spread during the past decade,” id. at 897).
203
See Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 898-99 (discussing FRB’s authority to
prohibit unfair or deceptive mortgage lending practices under the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act).
204
Id. at 899-900; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 195-96
(“When HOEPA passed, Congress instructed the Fed to implement the
[prohibition against unfair and deceptive acts and practices in mortgage
lending], but Alan Greenspan was dead set against obeying that
Congressional mandate so long as he was chairman.”); JOHNSON & KWAK,
supra note 10, at 141-42 (describing the FRB’s failure to enforce HOEPA
because of Greenspan’s opposition); Sudeep Reddy, “Currents: Fed Faces
Grilling on Consumer-Protection Lapses,” WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2009, at
A22 (same).
205
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 900-01; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 10, at 198-203 (describing the FRB’s failure to regulate mortgage
lending by nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies, due to Alan
Greenspan’s belief that such regulation would be counterproductive;
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 142-43 (same); Binyamin Appelbaum,
As Subprime Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed Didn’t Bother Barking, WASH.
POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1 (same).
202
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When indisputable evidence of the risks of subprime and
Alt-A loans emerged in 2005, FRB, FDIC, OCC and OTS responded
not with binding rules, but instead with weak “guidance” that urged
banks to follow prudent lending policies. The agencies’ guidance
encouraged—but did not require—banks to verify each borrower’s
ability to pay the fully-amortized rate on adjustable-rate mortgages.
Federal regulators did not take meaningful steps to ensure
compliance with their guidance until after the subprime crisis broke
out.206
In the absence of effective federal regulation, more than
thirty states passed laws to restrain predatory lending practices.
However, OCC and OTS quickly issued a series of preemptive
rulings that blocked the states from applying those laws to national
banks, federal thrifts and their subsidiaries.207 In combination, federal
regulatory inaction and federal preemption helped LCFIs that
controlled national banks and federal thrifts to capture the lion’s
share of the subprime and Alt-A mortgage lending markets during
the peak of the housing boom between 2005 and 2007.208 Several of

206

Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 901-03, 907-08; see also ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 10, at 165-66, 168, 174, 176 (discussing the reliance of federal
regulators on weak, nonbinding guidance even after they became aware of
significant and growing problems with risky nonprime lending); JOHNSON
& KWAK, supra note 10, at 143 (same).
207
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 909-15; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 10, at 157-62 (describing the adverse effects of OCC and OTS rules
that preempted state consumer protection laws); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 10, at 143-44 (same); Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us:
The Watchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Crisis Coming – and How They
Were Thwarted by the Banks and Washington, BUS. WK., Oct. 20, 2008, at
36 (same).
208
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 916-19; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 10, at 169-71, 176-81, 198-206 (explaining how OCC and OTS
preemption helped large national banks and federal thrifts to become
leading nonprime lenders); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 120-44
(same). Twelve of the fifteen largest subprime lenders in 2006 were subject
to regulation by federal banking agencies, and those twelve lenders
“controlled 50 percent of the subprime market.” ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 10, at 204; see also id. at 205 tbl. 10.1 (showing that OTS had
jurisdiction over five of the top 15 subprime lenders in 2006, while FDIC
had authority over one, FRB over three, and OCC over three).
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those federally-supervised LCFIs subsequently failed or required
federal assistance to avoid failure.209
3.

Four Factors Contributed to the
Regulatory Failures That Occurred
during the Subprime Lending Boom

Why didn’t federal regulators stop financial institutions from
generating huge volumes of high-risk credit that exploited
consumers, risked their own soundness and undermined the stability
of the financial markets? At least four factors contributed to this
systemic failure of regulation. First, during the credit boom banking
agencies focused on near-term profitability as a key indicator of the
“safety and soundness” of financial institutions. Federal regulators
therefore resisted proposals by consumer groups for tougher federal
lending rules, and OCC and OTS preempted state anti-predatory
lending laws that threatened to reduce bank profits from originating
and securitizing nonprime loans.210 Banking agencies also declined to
take tough enforcement actions to stop speculative lending and
capital markets activities as long as banks continued to report large
profits, despite misgivings among some regulators about the potential
long-term risks of those activities.211
Second, regulators competed—both within and across
national borders—to attract the allegiance of major financial
institutions. Regulatory competition encouraged agencies to follow
polices that would please their existing regulated constituents and
attract new ones. For example, OCC and OTS issued their
209

Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 918-19 (citing failures of Washington
Mutual and IndyMac, massive federal bailouts of American International
Group (AIG) and Citigroup, and federally-assisted emergency acquisitions
involving Countrywide, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia and National City); see
also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 169-71, 176-81, 200-03, 221-23
(discussing the same transactions).
210
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 173-76; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra
note 10, at 90-95; Levitin, supra note 10, at 152-57; U.S. Senate, Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Collapse:
Majority and Minority Staff Report (April 13, 2011) [hereinafter Senate
Wall Street Report], at 4-5, 224-26.
211
Frederick Tung & M. Todd Henderson, Pay for Regulator Performance,
at 25 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 574, 2011),
available at http://hq.ssrn.com/abstract=1916310; Wilmarth, supra note 10,
at 907 n.100; Senate Wall Street Report, supra note 210, at 224-26.
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preemptive rulings to help persuade state-chartered institutions that
they should operate under federal charters as national banks or
federal thrifts.212 OCC and OTS had strong financial incentives to
induce depository institutions to operate as national banks or federal
thrifts, because assessments paid by those institutions funded
virtually all of OCC’s and OTS’ budgets.213
In addition, federal regulators competed amongst themselves
to enlarge their stables of regulatory clients. For example, FRB and
OCC each sought to attract the patronage of major banks by
approving new activities and reducing regulatory requirements.214
Similarly, OTS persuaded Countrywide to convert from a national
bank to a federal thrift in early 2007 by promising that OTS would
give Countrywide more favorable supervisory treatment.215 Thus,
efforts by federal agencies to attract the allegiance of large
institutions resulted in domestic regulatory arbitrage and lax
regulation.216
OTS compiled the most egregious record of regulatory
laxity, and Congress decided to abolish OTS when it passed DoddFrank.217 For example, OTS granted extraordinary forbearance to
212

ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-62; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 10, at 143-44; Levitin, supra note 10, at 163-69; Wilmarth, supra note
10, at 910-17.
213
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 159-61; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra
note 10, at 90-94; Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 915-16.
214
Wilmarth, supra note 52, at 265, 265 n.150, 275-77, 277 n.203; see also
supra notes 128-138 and accompanying text (explaining that OCC has
consistently supported the interests of national banks); CARNELL, MACEY &
MILLER, supra note 84, at 61-67, 466-67, 491-94 (describing competition
between OCC and FRB during the 1990s to maintain the loyalty of the
largest banks, which could choose between status as national banks or as
state Fed member banks); Richard M. Whiting, The New ‘Tri-Partite’
Banking System, 17 BANKING POL'Y REP. (Aspen) No. 7, at 1, 14-15 (April
6, 1998) (observing that “overt rivalry” between OCC and FRB produced
“expansive regulatory actions” by both agencies).
215
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 159-60; Levitin, supra note 10, at
159-60.
216
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 159-66; Levitin, supra note 10, at
155-60.
217
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 25-26 (2010); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra
note 10, at 174-84 (describing OTS’ regulatory failures); Binyamin
Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over
Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH.
POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1 (same).
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Washington Mutual (“WaMu”), the biggest federal thrift with $300
billion of assets. WaMu’s assessments accounted for about oneseventh of OTS’ total revenues, and OTS Director John Reich
referred to WaMu in 2007 as “my largest constituent.”218 OTS
examiners uncovered “more than 500 serious operational
deficiencies” in WaMu’s lending and risk management practices
between 2004 and 2008.219 However, OTS continued to rate WaMu
as “fundamentally sound” until February 2008, and failed to take any
public enforcement action against WaMu prior to its failure in
September 2008.220 A Senate investigation concluded that OTS’
forbearance toward WaMu “reflected an OTS culture of deference to
bank management, demoralized examiners whose oversight efforts
were unsupported by their supervisors, and a narrow regulatory focus
that allowed short-term profits to excuse high risk activities and
disregarded systemic risk.”221
Cross-border competition with foreign regulators also
encouraged federal banking agencies to bend to the wishes of major
banks. Regulators worried that any decision to impose stricter
supervision on large U.S. financial institutions would cause those
institutions to shift more of their operations to London and other
foreign locations that offered “light touch” regulation.222 Federal
218

Senate Wall Street Report, supra note 210, at 165, 210.
Id. at 209.
220
Id. at 161-62, 177, 209-30. In addition, from 2006 to 2008, OTS limited
FDIC’s ability to examine WaMu and obstructed FDIC’s efforts to take
more vigorous supervisory measures against WaMu. Id. at 196-208.
221
Id. at 209. Federal investigators and commentators strongly criticized
OTS for similar regulatory lapses that contributed to the failures of other
leading thrifts, including IndyMac and Downey Federal. Id. at 233-35;
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 176-81; Appelbaum & Nakashima,
supra note 217.
222
Dariusz Wójcik, The dark side of NY-LON: Financial centres and the
global financial crisis 7 (Oxford University Sch. of Geography and the
Environment Working Papers in Employment, Work and Finance No. 1112, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1890644. For example, AIG
Financial Products, which sold massive volumes of credit default swaps that
destroyed its parent insurance company, conducted most of its operations in
London. Id.; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 221-23. For discussions of
international regulatory arbitrage and its impact on supervisory policies, see
VIRAL V. ACHARYA, PAUL WACHTEL & INGO WALTER, International
Alignment of Financial Sector Regulation, in RESTORING FINANCIAL
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 365, 366-71 (Viral A.
219
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agencies therefore repeatedly offered regulatory accommodations in
an effort to persuade LCFIs to keep more of their assets in the U.S.223
Thus, international as well as domestic regulatory competition
discouraged federal regulators from adopting tougher policies that
might have restrained speculative activities during the period leading
up to the financial crisis.
Third, during the past three decades, financial regulators and
Wall Street officials developed a “confluence of perspectives and
opinions” in which “Wall Street’s positions became the conventional
wisdom in Washington.”224 Regulators maintained continuous
contacts with LCFIs through (i) frequent consultations with bank
Acharya & Matthew Richardson, eds., 2009); HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER
& MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 283-84, 292-93 (2010); John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale,
Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L.
REV. 707, 716-17, 721 (2009); Cristie L. Ford, Macro and Micro Level
Effects on Responsive Financial Regulation, 44 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV.
(2011) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773098, at 1718.
223
Wójcik, supra note 222, at 7; Ford, supra note 222, at 17-18. During the
quarter century leading up to the financial crisis, U.S. banking regulators
sought to avoid imposing capital requirements on large U.S. banks that
would place them at a competitive disadvantage compared to foreign banks.
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 45-64, 84-85, 210-14 (2008). For
example, in 2004 federal regulators adopted an interagency rule setting a
very low capital charge for banks that provided backup lines of credit to
their sponsored off-balance-sheet conduits. Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 974.
In agreeing to that very lenient treatment, regulators noted that a proposed
higher capital charge “would put U.S. banks at a competitive disadvantage
relative to foreign banks.” Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg.
44908, 44910 (July 28, 2004). U.S. banking agencies were not mistaken in
fearing that LCFIs would shift operations and assets to jurisdictions with
more accommodating regulatory schemes. A recent study found that,
between 1996 and 2007, global banks headquartered in 26 developed
countries were significantly more likely to transfer capital to other nations,
and to open branches and subsidiaries in those nations, if the destination
countries adopted fewer activity restrictions, lower capital requirements,
weaker disclosure rules, looser auditing standards and more lenient
supervisory policies. Joel F. Houston , Chen Lin & Yue Ma, Regulatory
Arbitrage and International Bank Flows (Aug. 26, 2011), at 2-5, 17-19, 2429, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1525895.
224
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 92-97.
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representatives on important regulatory initiatives, and (ii) “dedicated
examiner teams” that maintained permanent on-site offices at the
largest banks and worked closely with bank managers.225 Regulators
and industry insiders also shared close “social, educational, or
experiential ties.”226 In contrast, regulators largely dismissed the
views of consumer advocates and other outsiders, who lacked access
to confidential supervisory information and frequently did not have
specialized expertise related to derivatives and other financial
innovations.227
The “‘revolving door’ phenomenon” produced even closer
relationships between regulators and industry leaders.228 LCFIs
regularly hired “former agency employees familiar with the inner
workings of the regulatory process.”229 Conversely, “as the world of
finance became more complicated and more central to the economy,”
the federal government increasingly relied on Wall Street veterans to

225

Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward
Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation (Aug. 14, 2011), at 13, 13 n.49,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924546;
see also Levitin, supra note 10, at 159 (describing the presence of
permanent teams of examiners at LCFIs).
226
Ford, supra note 222, at 23.
227
Omarova, supra note 225, at 13, 32-33 (describing the “secretive, closeddoor nature of the decision-making process involving financial regulators
and industry actors”); see also Ford, supra note 222, at 23 (“Regulators
operate within a relatively narrow, insulated, and expertise-based band of
human experience, characterized by relationships with sophisticated repeat
players. . . . [Regulators] may be cognitively predisposed against ‘outsiders’
who either lack facility with the dominant jargon or who take issue with
assumptions that no one in the industry take[s] issue with”); JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 10, at 94 (“Financial policy took on the trappings of a
branch of engineering, in which only those with hands-on experience on the
cutting edge of innovation were qualified to comment”); Appelbaum, supra
note 205 (reporting that FRB officials repeatedly dismissed warnings by
consumer advocates about the dangers posed by nonprime mortgage
lending).
228
Omarova, supra note 225, at 13; see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10,
at 93-97 (“[M]any senior officials moved back and forth between Wall
Street and Washington.”).
229
Omarova, supra note 225, at 13; see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10,
at 94-96 (explaining that financial industry officials and regulators
developed closer connections as experienced government officials
increasingly opted to leave government service and enter the private sector).
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fill senior regulatory positions.230 The continuous movement of
senior officials between Wall Street and Washington encouraged
regulators “to view their institutional interests or mission as largely
congruent with the interests of their regulated industry
constituency.”231
Consequently, the aggressive deregulatory policies pursued
by Alan Greenspan during his tenure as FRB chairman between 1987
and 2006 were not an aberration. Rather, Greenspan’s policies
reflected a widely-shared regulatory “mindset,” which included great
faith in the ability of financial markets to “self-correct” and great
skepticism about the federal government’s ability to regulate wisely
or effectively.232 Officials who disagreed with that mindset “were
marginalized as people who simply did not understand the bright
new world of modern finance.”233
Fourth, regulators were well aware of the enormous political
clout wielded by large financial institutions and their allies. The
financial sector (including finance, insurance and real estate firms)
spent $5.1 billion on lobbying and campaign contributions between
230

JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 92-95.
Omarova, supra note 225, at 13; see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10,
at 93, 95 (“[A]s banking insiders gained power and influence in
Washington, the positions they held . . . became orthodoxy inside the
Beltway. . . [G]roupthink was a major reason why the federal government
deferred to the interests of Wall Street repeatedly in the 1990s and 2000s.”).
232
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 898-906; see ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note
10, at 167-96 (explaining that regulators adopted a “mindset” in the 1990s
and 2000s that favored deregulation and placed great faith in the
effectiveness of market discipline); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at
97-109, 133-43 (same).
233
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 97; see id. at 103 (describing how
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) chief economist Raghuram Rajan
“was met with a torrent of attacks by Greenspan’s defenders,” including
FRB vice chairman Donald Kohn and Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers, when “Rajan presented a paper [in August 2005] asking in
prophetic tones about whether deregulation and innovation had increased
rather than decreased risk in the financial system”); id. at 7–9, 135–37
(explaining that (i) CFTC chairman Brooksley Born “provoked furious
opposition” when the CFTC issued a concept paper in May 1998, proposing
a study of whether to strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter
derivatives; and (ii) Ms. Born’s opponents—including Greenspan,
Summers, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin and SEC chairman Arthur
Levitt—persuaded Congress to pass legislation barring the CFTC from
acting on its proposal).
231

938

REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. 31

1998 and 2008.234 The financial sector was the “leading contributor
to political campaigns” after 1990,235 and it accounted for 15% of
total lobbying expenditures by all industry sectors between 1999 and
2006.236
The financial sector employed nearly 3,000 registered
lobbyists in 2007.237 In 2008 and 2009, the six largest banks (Bank of
America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley) employed more than 240 lobbyists who
previously worked in the Executive Branch or Congress.238 Financial
firms that were heavily involved in political lobbying also engaged in
more risky activities. An IMF staff study determined that financial
firms that engaged in the most intensive lobbying between 1999 and
2006 also made higher-risk mortgage loans, securitized more of their
loans, and suffered above-average losses in their stock market values
during the financial crisis.239
The financial sector received excellent legislative returns on
its huge political investments. A second IMF staff study found that
lobbying expenditures by financial firms significantly increased the
likelihood of passage for bills favored by the financial services
industry and also increased the probability of defeat for bills opposed
by the industry.240 Lobbying by the financial sector helped to produce

234

Essential Info. & Consumer Educ. Found., Sold Out: How Wall Street
and Washington Betrayed America 6, 15-16, 99-101 (Mar. 2009)
[hereinafter Sold Out], available at http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/
reports/sold_out.pdf.
235
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 90; see Levitin, supra note 10, at
160-61 (“The financial-services industry has been the single largest
contributor to congressional campaigns since 1990.”).
236
Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, A Fistful of Dollars:
Lobbying and the Financial Crisis 18, 32 (tbl.1a) (IMF Working Paper
WP/09/87, Dec. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1531520.
237
Sold Out, supra note 234, at 15-16, 100-01.
238
Kevin Connor, Big Bank Takeover: How Too-Big-to-Fail’s Army of
Lobbyists Has Captured Washington (Institute for America’s Future, May
2010), available at http://www.ourfuture.org/files/documents/big-banktakeover-final.pdf.
239
Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 236, at 4-6, 19-20, 22, 24-27.
240
Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra, Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol
Hill, and K Street 4, 15-18 (IMF Working Paper, June 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1915164. In addition, the lobbying efforts of
financial firms enjoyed greater success whenever (i) a member of Congress
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a series of landmark political victories between 1994 and 2005,
including enactment of (i) interstate banking legislation in 1994,241
(ii) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) in 1999,242 (iii) the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”) in 2000,243 and
(iv) bankruptcy reform legislation in 2005.244 In addition to those
affirmative victories, the financial services industry successfully
blocked passage of more than a dozen bills introduced between 2000
and 2007 that would have imposed tighter restrictions on high-risk
mortgage lending.245
Federal financial regulators who recommended tougher
restraints on financial institutions experienced strong “pushback”
from the industry.246 Regulators’ career interests and incentives
formerly worked in the financial industry or (ii) a financial firm hired a
lobbyist who had previously worked for a legislator. Id.
241
See Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking, supra note 184 at
1012-13 (describing the significance of Congress’ passage of interstate
banking legislation, which “made possible the establishment of large
nationwide banking organizations”); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at
89.
242
For discussions of the importance of GLBA, which repealed key
provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed commercial banks to
affiliate with securities firms and insurance companies by forming financial
holding companies, see JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 89, 91-92,
133-34; Wilmarth, The Dark Side of Universal Banking supra note 184, at
973-75.
243
See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 8-9, 92, 134-37 (describing
CFMA, which largely exempted over-the-counter derivatives from federal
regulation).
244
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(“BAPCPA”) “radically altered the policies underlying consumer
bankruptcy . . . , marking a significant shift in favor of creditors,” because
BAPCA made it much more difficult for consumers to obtain a substantial
or complete discharge of their debts in bankruptcy. Ronald J. Mann,
Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL.
L. REV. 375, 376-77; see Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy
Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31 (surveying the changes made
by BAPCPA to consumer bankruptcy statutes).
245
Igan, Mishra & Tressel, supra note 236, at 17-18, 55-59 (Appendix).
246
Wilmarth, supra note 10, at 907-08; The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report:
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial
and Economic Crisis in the United States (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter FCIC
Report], at 20-22, 172-73, 307; see also JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10,
at 7-9, 97, 134-37 (describing how the financial industry successfully
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discouraged them from challenging the formidable political power
wielded by LCFIs and their allies.247 Deregulation and forbearance
were safer alternatives for regulators, especially during a period of
apparently unprecedented prosperity for the financial sector.248
4.

CFPB Is Likely To Be More Resistant to
Regulatory Capture than the Federal
Banking Agencies

In view of the financial services industry’s success in
securing extensive forbearance from federal bank regulators during
the past two decades, why should we expect CFPB to be more
resistant to industry pressure? There are at least two major reasons
for optimism. First, CFPB’s unified mission makes it different from
most federal banking agencies. As described above, prudential
regulators typically gave short shrift to consumer protection and
instead focused on increasing the banking industry’s “safety and
soundness” by adopting policies that promoted higher short-term
profits for banks.249 In contrast, CFPB has a single clear mandate to
protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, abusive or discriminatory
practices.250 While Dodd-Frank requires CFPB to consider the
potential costs and benefits of its proposed rules, and to respond to
safety-and-soundness concerns raised by prudential regulators,
resisted tougher regulation); Tung & Henderson, supra note 211, at 29-30
(explaining that when regulators issued mild warnings about risky lending
in 2006, “[t]housands of industry comments poured in objecting to the
regulators' intrusion, and the FDIC and other agencies backed off, clarifying
that they didn't intend to impose limits”); Sold Out, supra note 234, at 8, 4249 (observing that “officials in government who dared to propose stronger
protections for investors and consumers consistently met with hostility and
defeat”).
247
Tung & Henderson, supra note 211, at 28-30.
248
JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 10, at 7-9, 97, 103-09, 134-43, 151-52;
FCIC Report, supra note 246, at 173, 307.
249
See supra notes 197-20911 and accompanying text; Bar-Gill & Warren,
supra note 10, at 90-91 (“These agencies are designed with a primary
mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. This
means protecting banks' profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a
lesser priority . . . .”); Levitin, supra note 10, at 155-56 (explaining that
“[r]egulators have permitted profitability-protection to trump consumer
protection for all but the most egregious behavior”).
250
Dodd-Frank § 1021(b); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11, 164 (2010).
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CFPB’s consumer protection mission remains paramount. The
unambiguous primacy of that mission should motivate CFPB to take
its statutory responsibilities seriously.251
Second, CFPB’s institutional safeguards—including its
policymaking autonomy and its assured source of funding252—make
it substantially more insulated from industry capture compared to
OCC, CFTC, SEC and FRB. As shown above, OCC relies for most
of its funding on assessments paid by national banks, and OCC could
lose significant funding if major national banks converted to statechartered banks. OCC therefore has powerful budgetary incentives to
please its largest regulatory constituents.253 As discussed in the next
section, CFTC and SEC rely on congressional appropriations and are
therefore highly vulnerable to budgetary leverage exerted by
congressional allies of their regulated constituents.
FRB is not subject to the same type of industry-related
budgetary pressures. FRB and the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”) as
a whole finance their operations by drawing on earnings from the
Fed’s investment portfolio of Treasury securities and other debt
instruments.254 However, the Fed is subject to significant industry
influence due to the unique governance structure for the twelve
regional Federal Reserve Banks (“Reserve Banks”).255 Member
banks in each Fed district elect three Class A directors and three
Class B directors for that district’s Reserve Bank, while FRB
appoints three Class C directors. In each district, Class B directors
and Class C directors vote jointly to select the Reserve Bank’s
251

Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 10, at 98-100. By maintaining CFPB’s
single-Director governance structure, Congress would enhance CFPB’s
accountability to the public for carrying out its consumer protection
mission. See Levitin Testimony, supra note 118, at 11 (“A CFPB Director
who . . . fails to do enough to protect consumers cannot deflect blame for his
actions.”).
252
See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing CFPB’s
autonomy and its guaranteed source of funding from the Fed).
253
See supra notes 128-140, 212-16 and accompanying text.
254
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62.
255
Renee B. Adams, “Who Directs the Fed?” 3-5, 10-14 (European
Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 293, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1756509
(discussing
the
structure
and
responsibilities of the Reserve Banks); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, FED. RES. BANK GOVERNANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO BROADEN
DIRECTOR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS AND INCREASE TRANSPARENCY , GAO12-18 , 6-7, 9-16, 41 (2011) [hereinafter GAO Fed Governance Report].
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president. Thus, member banks elect two-thirds of the directors of
each Reserve Bank, and member banks indirectly exercise (through
Class B directors) shared control over the selection of Reserve Bank
presidents.256
The voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee
(“FOMC”), which determines the nation’s monetary policy, include
FRB’s seven governors and five Reserve Bank presidents. The
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“New York
Fed”) is a permanent FOMC voting member, while four FOMC
voting seats rotate among the remaining eleven Reserve Bank
presidents. All twelve Reserve Bank presidents are entitled to attend
and participate in FOMC meetings.257 In addition, each Reserve Bank
is responsible (under FRB’s oversight) for examining and
supervising state member banks and bank holding companies
headquartered in the Reserve Bank’s district.258 Thus, Reserve Bank
presidents play significant roles in the Fed’s monetary policy
decisions and bank supervisory policies.
At first glance, the Federal Reserve Act appears to call for a
diversity of backgrounds among directors of Reserve Banks. Class A
directors usually are senior bank executives, but Class B and Class C
directors are not allowed to serve as directors, officers or employees
of banks, and Class C directors may not own bank stocks.259 In
256

GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 10-13. Prior to the
enactment of Dodd-Frank, Class A directors also voted to elect Reserve
Bank presidents, and member banks therefore controlled the selection of
presidents through their ability to elect Class A and Class B directors.
Dodd-Frank removed the right of Class A directors to vote for Reserve
Bank presidents, so that the power to select presidents is now divided
equally between Class B directors (elected by member banks) and Class C
directors (appointed by FRB). Id. at 10, 53; H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 876
(2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 732.
257
GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 6-9, 14-16.
258
Id. at 7.
259
12 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303, 304 (1977); see GAO Fed Governance Report,
supra note 255, at 10-12 (describing the requirements for Class A, B, and C
directors). FRB designates one Class C director as the chairman of the board
for each Reserve Bank. Strangely, however, while the Federal Reserve Act
prohibits Class C directors from owning bank stocks, the Act requires the
chairman to have “tested banking experience.” 12 U.S.C. §§ 303, 305
(1977); see GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 10-12
(explaining that the Class C director serving as board chairman must have
“tested banking experience”).
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addition, the Federal Reserve Act provides that Class B and Class C
directors should “represent the public . . . with due but not exclusive
consideration to the interests of agriculture, commerce, industry,
services, labor and consumers.”260
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve Act’s apparent
preference for diversity, the boards of directors of Reserve Banks
have typically been dominated by senior executives of major banks,
large financial firms and leading nonfinancial corporations that are
customers of the biggest banks. A recent study found that “class A
[Reserve Bank] directorships are dominated by large banks.”261 The
study determined that bank size was the most significant factor in
determining whether a particular bank was represented by a Class A
director between 1987 and 2009, while factors related to bank
performance were much less important.262 For example, Jamie
Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase—the nation’s largest bank—
serves as a Class A director of the New York Fed.263
Similarly, despite their statutorily prescribed role as
representatives of the public, Class B and Class C directors have
frequently been drawn from the ranks of senior executives of large
nonbank financial companies and big nonfinancial corporations that
are clients of major banks. For example, Richard Fuld, chairman of
Lehman Brothers, served as a Class B director of the New York Fed
until shortly before his firm declared bankruptcy in September
2008.264 During 2008 and 2009, the New York Fed’s board of
directors also included Jeffrey Immelt, chairman of General Electric
(a Class B director), and Stephen Friedman, a director and former

260

12 U.S.C. § 302 (1977).
Adams, supra note 255, at 21-25.
262
Id.
263
See Jamie Dimon’s biography, N.Y. FED, http://www.newyorkfed.org/
aboutthefed/orgchart/board/dimon.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2012)
(describing Jamie Dimon’s experience); Alan Kline, JP Morgan Chase
Overtakes B of A as Largest U.S. Bank, AM. BANKER, Oct. 19, 2011
(reporting that JP Morgan Chase had become the biggest U.S. bank and had
$2.29 trillion of assets as of Sept. 30, 2011, compared to $2.22 trillion of
assets for Bank of America).
264
GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 35-36; Neil Irwin, N.Y.
Fed Chairman Resigns: Friedman’s Role as Goldman Sachs Director
Questioned, WASH. POST, May 8, 2009.
261
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chairman of Goldman Sachs (a Class C director), whom FRB
designated as chairman of the board of the New York Fed.265
A recent GAO study on Fed governance determined that
seventy-three of the Reserve Bank’s head office directors serving
from 2006 to 2010 were drawn from the banking industry, while only
eleven head office directors during that period were representatives
of consumers or labor.266 In addition, Class B and Class C directors
of Reserve Banks have included senior executives of major
nonfinancial corporations that are customers of the largest banks.267
Thus, members of Reserve Bank boards of directors have
predominantly reflected the views and interests of major banks and
their clients and financial counterparties.
Stephen Friedman’s service at the New York Fed provided a
striking example of the conflicts of interest that have resulted from
close linkages between the Fed and top financial executives. After
Goldman converted to a bank holding company in September 2008,
FRB granted a waiver that allowed Friedman (i) to continue serving
as a Class C director and as chairman of the board of the New York
Fed and (ii) to retain his ownership of 46,000 shares of Goldman
stock. Without the FRB’s waiver, Friedman would have been
disqualified from serving as a Class C director unless he resigned his
Goldman directorship and divested his Goldman stock.268 Moreover,
Friedman purchased 37,000 additional shares of Goldman stock
while his waiver request was pending, and during that period the
New York Fed directed AIG to pay $14 billion to Goldman,
265

GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 33-34, 35 (fig. 10), 39;
Scott Lanman, Friedman Quits New York Fed on Concern About Goldman
Sachs Ties, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 8, 2009, available at http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a68WNA7cKzu8.
266
GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 19 (fig. 4), 21.
267
Orson Aguilar, Viewpoint: N.Y. Fed Board Move Tone-Deaf On Public
Service, AM. BANKER, Oct. 16, 2009, at 9 (criticizing the appointment of
Pfizer’s chief executive officer, Jeffrey Kindler, as a Class B director of the
New York Fed, because Pfizer relied on loans from Bank of America,
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase to finance its recent
merger with Wyeth); Steven Sloan, As Fed’s Role Grows, Doubt Spurs
Critics, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2009, available at http://www.
americanbanker.com/issues/174_97/-378660-1.html?zkPrintable=true
(reporting that Pepsico’s chief executive was a Class B director at the New
York Fed, while senior executives of United Parcel Service, Home Depot
and Chevron served as Class C directors at other Federal Reserve Banks).
268
GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 33-34, 35 (fig. 10).
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representing full payment of AIG’s obligations to Goldman under
credit default swaps (“CDS”).269 In addition, Friedman led the search
committee for a new president of the New York Fed after Timothy
Geithner left that position to become Treasury Secretary, and the
New York Fed ultimately selected William Dudley, Goldman’s
former chief economist, as its new president.270 Friedman resigned as
a Class C director and as chairman of the New York Fed in May
2009, after his dual role provoked intense controversy and
widespread criticism.271
A GAO report issued in October 2011 warned that “[h]aving
the Class A directors, who represent member banks, and the Class B
directors, who are elected by member banks . . . creates an
appearance of a conflict of interest.”272 The GAO found that this
269

Aaron Lorenzo, Investigations: House Panel Delving Deeper Into
Holdings Of Former New York Fed Chair in Goldman, 94 BNA BANKING
REP. 551 (2010); Letter from the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform to Ben S. Bernanke, FRB Chairman (Mar. 18, 2010), available at
http://democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Correspondence/3-1810-Honorable_Ben_Bernanke-Chairman_Board_of_Gov-AIG.pdf.
[hereinafter House Oversight Letter on Friedman Directorship] After the
Fed and the Treasury Department rescued AIG in September 2008, the New
York Fed directed AIG to pay off its obligations to CDS counterparties at
“100% of face value,” a decision that provoked sharp criticism from two
government oversight bodies. AIG paid Goldman $14 billion to discharge
CDS obligations, and Goldman was the second-largest recipient of CDS
payments from AIG. FCIC Report, supra note 246, at 376-79 (listing AIG’s
payments to CDS counterparties, including Goldman, and citing strong
criticisms of those payments in two reports issued by the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“SIGTARP”) and the
Congressional Oversight Panel).
270
Irwin, supra note 264; Lanman, supra note 265.
271
Irwin, supra note 264 (reporting that Friedman’s service at the New York
Fed and FRB’s waiver became “Exhibit A for what critics perceive as a toocozy relationship between the New York Fed, which serves as the central
bank’s eyes and ears on Wall Street, and the bankers it oversees”); House
Oversight Letter on Friedman Directorship, supra note 269 (declaring that
“Mr. Friedman’s dual role at the New York Fed and Goldman, his purchase
of Goldman stock in December 2008, and the Federal Reserve’s waiver of
his conflict of its conflict of interest policy after the fact, raise serious
questions about the integrity of the Fed’s operations”).
272
GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 41; see id. at 32
(stating that Reserve Bank “directors’ affiliations with financial firms . . .
continue to pose reputational risks to the Federal Reserve System”);
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perceived conflict of interest was accentuated during the financial
crisis, because “at least 18 former and current Class A, B and C
directors from 9 Reserve Banks . . . were affiliated with institutions
that used at least one [Fed-administered] emergency program.”273 For
example, the New York Fed provided emergency assistance to a
major bank and three large financial firms while executives of all
four organizations served as directors of the New York Fed.274
Researchers have confirmed that banks have received
material benefits while their executives served as directors of
Reserve Banks. Two academic studies found that banks were
significantly more likely to receive capital assistance under the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) if their executives served
as directors of either Reserve Banks or Reserve Bank branches.275 A
third study determined that (i) banks whose executives were elected
as Reserve Bank Class A directors between 1990 and 2009
experienced significant abnormal gains in their stock market values,
and (ii) banks whose executives served as Reserve Bank directors
during that twenty-year period were significantly less likely to fail
Cheyenne Hopkins, Crisis or No, Debate Over Reg Reform Splintering, AM.
BANKER, May 21, 2009, at 1 (quoting Senator Shelby’s statement during a
Senate committee hearing that “[a]n inherent web of conflict is built into the
DNA of the Fed as it now exists”); Sloan, supra note 267 (quoting Kevin
Jacques, a prominent academic, who described the governance structure for
Federal Reserve Banks as “really, really clubby”).
273
GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 39.
274
Jamie Dimon, chairman of JP Morgan Chase, served as a Class A
director of the New York Fed while his bank “participated in various
emergency programs and served as one of the clearing banks for emergency
lending programs” administered by the New York Fed. Id. at 40; Donna
Borak, GAO Fears Conflicts of Interest at Fed, AM. BANKER, Oct. 20, 2011,
at 2. Similarly, as previously noted, executives of three major financial
firms served as directors of the New York Fed while their institutions
participated in Fed emergency programs. Richard Fuld, chairman of
Lehman Brothers, and Jeffrey Immelt, chairman of General Electric, served
as Class B directors, while Stephen Friedman, a director and former
chairman of Goldman Sachs, served as a Class C director and as chairman
of the board. GAO Fed Governance Report, supra note 255, at 33-36, 39.
275
Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, TARP Investments: Financials and
Politics 3-4, 19-20, 31-32, 35 (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper No. 1127,
2010), available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/
63451/9/1127_duchin_oct10.pdf; Lei Li, TARP Funds Distribution and
Bank Loan Growth 3-4, 20 (April 22, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567073.
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(compared with other banks), and none of those banks failed after
receiving government assistance.276 The foregoing evidence indicates
that large financial institutions have exerted substantial influence on
Fed policies through their election of bank executives and client
executives as Reserve Bank directors. Thus, despite the Fed’s
political and financial autonomy, the Fed’s governance structure
evidently has made it vulnerable to considerable industry influence.
In contrast to OCC and the Fed, FDIC has demonstrated a
significantly higher degree of independence from industry influence.
Like CFPB, FDIC has a clearly defined mission and an assured
source of funding. FDIC views its fundamental purpose as protecting
bank depositors and defending the integrity of the Deposit Insurance
Fund (“DIF”).277 FDIC also has a guaranteed funding source that is
not subject to congressional control or vulnerable to charter
competition. FDIC collects risk-adjusted assessments from FDICinsured institutions, and virtually all banks operate with FDIC
insurance.278
FDIC has frequently demonstrated its commitment to
protecting the DIF as well as its willingness to resist banking
industry influence. Over the past three decades, bank representatives
have repeatedly criticized the agency for imposing higher capital
requirements on banks in order to safeguard the DIF. Critics have
mocked FDIC’s acronym as standing for “Forever Demanding
Increased Capital.”279 During the late 1990s and early 2000s, FDIC
276

Adams, supra note 255, at 28-39.
DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE’S WAR ON THE
GREAT PANIC 219-20 (2009) (stating that FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair was
“a fierce and relentless defender of the FDIC fund [during the financial
crisis], putting protection of that kitty above all else”); Tom Fox, How the
FDIC got to the top of the heap: The No. 1-ranked agency’s leader extols
his workers’ sense of purpose, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2011, at B4 (quoting
Acting FDIC Chairman Martin Gruenberg’s view that “[t]he great strength
of the [FDIC] is that it has a very clear and understandable mission, and that
mission is to insure the deposits that people have in federally insured
financial institutions”).
278
CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 84, at 62-63, 316-18; MICHAEL
P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION § 1.11 (West Concise
Hornbook, 3d ed. 2011).
279
For examples of this mocking description of FDIC, see All Things
Considered: “FDIC Chief Earned Rep As a Consumer Advocate,” Nat’l
Pub. Radio broadcast, June 27, 2011 (transcript available on Lexis) (quoting
banking industry consultant Bert Ely’s use of the same description); Barbara
277
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fought hard to maintain tougher capital rules for U.S. banks
(including leverage capital requirements) during international
negotiations over the Basel II capital accord. FDIC also strongly
questioned the reliability of Basel II’s “advanced internal risk-based”
(“A-IRB”) method for determining capital requirements. In contrast,
the Fed aligned itself with the largest banks in pushing for
incorporation of the A-IRB methodology into the Basel II accord.280
FDIC’s deep skepticism about the A-IRB approach proved to be
well-founded when LCFIs relied on internal risk-based models “to
operate with capital levels that were ‘very, very low, . . .
unacceptably low’ during the period leading up to the financial
crisis.”281
During the crisis, FDIC chairman Sheila Bair disagreed with
Fed and Treasury officials on several occasions about the desirability
of establishing bailout programs for large troubled financial
institutions. For example, FDIC refused to concur with the New
York Fed and Treasury in using the “systemic risk exception”

A. Rehm, Editor at Large: Endgame for Bair Is No Less Audacious, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 18, 2010, at 1 (quoting same description, and reporting that
FDIC has consistently been the strongest proponent of tougher capital rules
for banks); Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr., Comment: Issuing Trust-Preferred Too
Good a Game to Sit Out, AM. BANKER, Dec. 21, 1998; Jed Horowitz, Let
‘Em Eat Leverage, AM. BANKER, Oct. 3, 1990, at 2; Paul M. Horvitz, The
Increase in Capital Standards Will Make Banking Safer, AM. BANKER, Aug.
24, 1988, at 4 (quoting same description, and observing that “FDIC wants
increased capital because bank capital provides a cushion for the insurance
system against losses due to bank failures,” while “[b]ankers oppose higher
capital standards because they fear that higher capital ratios result in a lower
return on equity”); Washington’s Financial Cops at a Glance: American
Banker Guide to the Regulators, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 1984, at 29 (quoting
same description); Paul S. Nadler, A Conference of Directors in Michigan
Shows Banking Communications at Work, AM. BANKER, Nov. 17, 1980, at 4
(quoting same description, and noting that “bankers and board members
agreed that a bank should try to get away with as little capital as possible”).
280
TARULLO, supra note 223, at 99-130; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
“Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail
Problem,” 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 759 n.203 (2010).
281
Wilmarth, Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, supra note 57, at 1010 (quoting
Base Camp Basel, ECONOMIST, Jan 21, 2010, available at www.economist.
com/node/15328883).
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(“SRE”)282 to protect WaMu’s bondholders when WaMu failed on
September 25, 2008. Bair insisted that WaMu’s uninsured
bondholders, rather than the DIF and taxpayers, should bear the
losses caused by WaMu’s reckless lending policies.283 Similarly,
FDIC originally resisted proposals by Treasury and the Fed to use the
SRE on two subsequent occasions: (i) on September 29, 2008, when
federal officials invoked the SRE to protect uninsured creditors
(including bondholders) when Wachovia failed, and (ii) in October
2008, when federal officials approved a program to guarantee debt
securities issued by FDIC-insured banks. On both occasions, Fed and
Treasury officials exerted great pressure to overcome Bair’s
reluctance to expose the DIF to potential losses by invoking the
SRE.284
FDIC also demonstrated a much tougher attitude than the
Fed and OCC when the largest banks sought to exit the TARP capital
assistance program by repurchasing the preferred stock they had sold
to Treasury. From November 2009 to June 2011, FDIC tried
unsuccessfully to force several major banks (including Bank of
America, Wells Fargo and PNC) to issue to investors at least $1 in
new common stock for every $2 of TARP preferred stock they
repurchased from Treasury. FDIC insisted on the 1-for-2 ratio in
order to “increase the quality” of the seven banks’ capital structures
and limit the risk those banks posed to the DIF.285 However, OCC
pushed for much more lenient terms for the big banks, and FRB took
an intermediate position. Over the FDIC’s objections, regulators
ultimately allowed the banks to repurchase their TARP preferred
stock while failing to meet the 1-for-2 ratio advocated by FDIC.286
282

Id. at 1001, 1022-23 (discussing the SRE embodied in 12 U.S.C. §
1823(c)(4)(G), and observing that concurrence among the Treasury, Fed and
FDIC is required to invoke the SRE).
283
WESSEL, supra note 277, at 218-21 (explaining that New York Fed
President Timothy Geithner argued strongly that the SRE should have been
invoked to authorize FDIC to protect bondholders when WaMu failed, but
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke agreed with FDIC chairman Bair’s position
that the SRE should not be used); FCIC Report, supra note 246, at 366
(stating that Treasury officials also disagreed with Chairman Bair’s
position).
284
WESSEL, supra note 277, at 221-23, 232-33; FCIC Report, supra note
246, at 366-69.
285
“Exiting TARP: Repayments by the Largest Financial Institutions,”
SIGTARP Audit Report 11-005 (Sept. 29, 2011), at 19-30.
286
Id. at 20-63.
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Former FRB Vice Chairman Donald Kohn summarized the
positions of the three agencies in the following terms: “[W]hile FDIC
wanted the 1-for-2 to be met entirely with new common stock, “the
OCC was much more relaxed than that, and [FRB] was a little more
relaxed than the FDIC.”287 Similarly, FRB Governor Daniel Tarullo
explained that “FDIC was understandably concerned about its
exposure to institutions through [its debt guarantee program] and the
deposit insurance fund, [while] OCC tends to look more narrowly at
specific national banks with less of a macro perspective.”288
In sum, FDIC’s clearly-defined mission and its secure source
of funding have encouraged the agency to act with more
independence from the banking industry, compared to OCC and the
Fed. A recent study concluded that, while FDIC made some
supervisory mistakes during the subprime lending boom, its overall
regulatory record during the subprime lending boom was better than
that of OCC and the Fed.289 The FDIC’s greater willingness to resist
industry influence indicates that CFPB’s unambiguous mission and
assured funding should encourage a similarly independent attitude
within CFPB.290

287

Id. at 20 (quoting Mr. Kohn’s remarks to SIGTARP).
Id. (summarizing Mr. Tarullo’s statement to SIGTARP).
289
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 10, at 157-205; see id. at 163 (observing
that state banks supervised by FDIC and FRB recorded much lower default
rates on their mortgage loans from 2006 to 2008 compared to national banks
regulated by OCC and federal thrifts regulated by OTS); id. at 184-87
(criticizing FDIC for failing to stop unsound subprime lending by Fremont
Investment & Loan and Franklin Bank, but noting that those failures
appeared to be “isolated instances,” while “the OCC and the OTS were in a
state of denial about the grave nature of [national] bank and [federal] thrift
involvement in reckless lending and the equally grave nature of their own
failure to supervise”); id. at 204-05 (showing that FRB, OCC and OTS
supervised 11 of the 15 largest subprime lenders in 2006, while FDIC
regulated only one of those lenders (Fremont)).
290
See Barkow, supra note 7, at 44-45, 77 (concluding that that CFPB’s
“guaranteed funding stream” from the Fed provides the bureau with
significant insulation against industry capture).
288
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Requiring CFPB to Depend on Congressional
Appropriations for Its Budget Would Make
CFPB Vulnerable to Political and Industry
Capture

The Republican-sponsored House legislation would remove
a crucial guarantee of CFPB’s autonomy by giving Congress
complete control over CFPB’s budget.291 Any regulatory agency that
depends on Congress for its budget is vulnerable to political
influence exerted by the regulated industry through the
appropriations process.292 For example, Congress controls CPSC’s
budget, and since its creation in 1980 the agency has been
“chronically underfunded and understaffed. . . . As a result, CPSC
has been no match for the industry participants it is charged with
regulating.”293
Except for CFTC and SEC, no federal financial regulator is
subject to congressional appropriations.294 Congress has undermined
the effectiveness of CFTC and SEC over the past two decades by
frequently failing to provide those agencies with adequate funds.295
291

See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing a Republicanbacked House bill that would make CFPB’s entire budget subject to
congressional appropriations).
292
Barkow, supra note 7, at 42-44.
293
Id. at 67; see also id. at 42 n.103, 44, 67 (describing CPSC’s lack of
adequate resources to fulfill its statutory mandate, due to Congress’ refusal
to increase its budget); Andrew Zajac, New leadership on U.S. product
safety: Obama vows to revitalize ailing CPSC, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 2009, at
C14 (reporting that CPSC had been “underfunded for years” and had only
430 employees in 2009, compared with 978 in 1980; as a result, the “gutted
agency became a docile captive of the industry it regulates”).
294
Sean Lengell, Schumer: Boost SEC’s budget to fight fraud, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2009, at A09.
295
Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Speech at the
Brodsky Family Lecture at Northwestern Univ. Law School (Nov. 9, 2010)
(stating that, when Ms. Schapiro became SEC chairman in January 2009,
the SEC was “underfunded and understaffed . . . . We were behind, and
falling further behind”), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2010/spch110910mls.htm; Enhanced Investor Protection After the
Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 5, 13 (2011) (statement of Lynn Turner, Former
SEC Chief Accountant) (stating that one reason why CFTC and SEC were
“ineffective” during the decade leading up to the financial crisis was that
both agencies “lacked adequate funding and resources;” in particular, “SEC
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After Republicans took control of the House in the 2010 midterm
elections, Republican leaders announced plans to delay the
implementation of Dodd-Frank’s reforms of the derivatives and
securities markets by squeezing the budgets of CFTC and SEC.296
Incoming House majority leader Eric Cantor (R-VA) reportedly said
that “denying funds to the SEC and other agencies is ‘what the
American people are expecting.’”297
During 2011, Republicans blocked any significant increases
in the CFTC’s and SEC’s operating budgets.298 At congressional
oversight hearings in December 2011, CFTC chairman Gary Gensler
and SEC chairman Mary Schapiro expressed grave doubts about their
agencies’ ability to adopt and enforce the new regulations required
by Dodd-Frank unless Congress approved major increases in their
budgets.299 Republican leaders and the financial services industry did
was essentially starved by Congress of necessary resources during much of
the 1990s,” and SEC again lacked adequate funding between 2005 and
2007), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=c7085db2-ae43-471a-aa5c357f2226a096&Witness_ID=df29c589-0882-4468-b4be-96f53902b567;
Memo to Congress: It’s time for SEC to be self-funded, INVESTMENT NEWS,
May 16, 2011, at 0008 (stating that “SEC has been chronically underfunded
for years”) (available on Lexis); Richard Sansom, Republicans’ return to
power threatens CFTC’s implementation of Dodd-Frank, SNL DAILY GAS
REPORT, Jan. 12, 2011 (reporting that “CFTC has been underfunded for at
least a decade”).
296
Bruce Carton, How Can Congress Kill Dodd-Frank? By Underfunding
It, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Jan. 2011; Kelsey Snell, Industry Looks to Derail
Dodd-Frank Enforcement, NAT’L J., Feb. 15, 2011.
297
Carton, supra note 296 (quoting Rep. Cantor).
298
Id.; William D. Cohan, Republicans Try to Starve Wall Street Watchdog,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 27, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-11-27/republicans-try-to-starve-wall-street-watchdogwilliam-d-cohan.html; Sansom, supra note 295 ; Robert Schmidt et al., The
Great Regulatory Hold-Up, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 14-20,
2011, at 24; James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall St. Is Tossed a
Bone, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, at A1; see Roger Nayak, The sticky
politics of MF Global’s demise, SNL FINANCIAL SERVICES DAILY, Dec. 7,
2011 (reporting that “some observers feel that tightened budgets have
hamstrung the CFTC and the SEC” in their efforts to implement DoddFrank, and noting that the agencies had missed 71 of 95 deadlines for
adopting rules to carry out Dodd-Frank’s reforms of derivatives regulation).
299
Joe Adler, MF Global, Gensler Dominate Hearing on Derivatives Rules,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2011, available at http://www.americanbanker.
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not disagree with these gloomy assessments of the likely impact of
budget stringency on the two agencies.300 Rather, they seem
determined to “defang Dodd-Frank” by “squeezing [CFTC and SEC]
through the budget process.”301
As discussed above, Republican legislators and major banks
took a very different position when they pushed for legislation to
create FHFA as a new and more powerful regulator for Fannie and
Freddie.302 Republicans and their banking allies insisted that FHFA
must have an independent, secure funding source that was not subject
to congressional appropriations. They pointed out that Fannie and
Freddie had frequently used their political clout to persuade Congress
to cut OFHEO’s budget and thereby undermine OFHEO’s
enforcement efforts. Representative Richard Baker (R-LA), a leading
proponent of legislation to establish FHFA, declared that OFHEO
“historically has been impaired” because it “must come to the
Congress for its funding.”303 Baker emphasized the importance of
com/issues/176_232/dodd-frank-act-mfglobal-1044523-1html?zkPrintable=
true; Lindsey White, As regulators face Senate, Gensler grilled over MF
Global, SNL BANK AND THRIFT DAILY, Dec. 7, 2011; see Kevin Wack,
Reform Implementation and Budget Crunch Collide, AM. BANKER, July 22,
2011, at 4 (reporting on congressional testimony by CFTC chairman
Gensler and SEC chairman Schapiro that their agencies could not fulfill
their responsibilities under Dodd-Frank without significant budget
increases).
300
See Snell, supra note 296 (reporting that CFTC chairman Gensler’s
“worries” about his agency’s ability to implement Dodd-Frank with a
constrained budget “are music to the industry”).
301
Id. For other commentators expressing the same view, see, e.g., Carton,
supra note 296; Cohan, supra note 298 (discussing Republican efforts to cut
CFTC budget); Stewart, supra note 298 (discussing the Republicans’
success in cutting SEC’s budget by $200 million).
302
See supra notes 147-151 and accompanying text (describing support by
Republicans and major banks for establishment of FHFA as a more
powerful regulator for Fannie and Freddie).
303
151 CONG. REC. H9131 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2005) (remarks of Rep.
Baker). In the following passage, a prominent journalist described how
Fannie’s supporters in Congress used the appropriations process to
hamstring OFHEO’s supervisory effort:
Fannie’s allies in Congress . . . made sure that . . .
OFHEO, unlike any other [financial] regulator, would be
subject to the appropriations process, meaning its funding
was at the mercy of politicians – politicians who often
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creating “an independently funded regulator, with all the tools a
modern regulator should have to oversee vastly complex financial
enterprises to protect the American taxpayer from unwarranted
losses.”304 The final legislation established FHFA as a “strong,
independent regulator” funded by assessments collected from the
GSEs, and the legislation stipulated that FHFA would not be subject
to the appropriations process.305
In creating CFPB, Congress drew directly on FHFA’s secure
funding model. The Senate committee report on Dodd-Frank
declared that “the assurance of adequate funding [from the Fed],
independent of the Congressional appropriations process, is
absolutely essential to the independent operations of any financial
regulator.”306 The Senate report pointed out that the need for
independent funding of financial regulators
was a hard learned lesson from the difficulties faced
by [OFHEO], which was subject to repeated
Congressional pressure because it was forced to go
through the annual appropriations process. It is
widely acknowledged that this helped limit
OFHEO’s effectiveness. For that reason, ensuring
that OFHEO”s successor agency . . . would not be
subject to appropriations was a high priority for the
Committee and the Congress in [passing] the
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.307

took their cues from Fannie. Not surprisingly, OFHEO
was a notoriously weak regulator.
Bethany McLean, Fannie Mae’s Last Stand, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2009, at 51;
see also Binyamin Appelbaum et al., How Washington Failed to Rein In
Fannie, Freddie: As Profits Grew, Firms Used Their Power to Mask Peril,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at A01 (reporting that OFHEO “was required
to get its budget approved by Congress, while agencies that regulated banks
set their own budgets. That gave congressional allies [of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac] an easy way to exert pressure” on OFHEO).
304
151 CONG. REC. H9131 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 2005) (remarks of Rep.
Baker).
305
H.R. REP. NO. 110-142, at 87-88, 126-27 (2007).
306
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 163 (2010).
307
Id.
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Several Republican leaders who are pushing for legislation to
subject CFPB to the appropriations process were strong proponents
of secure funding for FHFA.308 It is therefore very difficult to
identify any persuasive rationale for the attempt to remove CFPB’s
budgetary independence beyond the desire “to undercut an agency
[Republican leaders] never liked to begin with.”309
V.

Conclusion

Congress decided to establish CFPB after concluding that
federal bank regulators repeatedly failed to protect consumers during
the credit boom leading up to the financial crisis. Because of the
prudential regulators’ systematic failures to protect consumers,
Congress vested CFPB with sole responsibility and clear
accountability for implementing effective consumer safeguards. Title
X of Dodd-Frank authorizes CFPB to issue regulations, conduct
investigations and prosecute enforcement proceedings to protect
consumers against unfair, deceptive, abusive and discriminatory
financial practices. Title X promotes CFPB’s independence from
political influence by granting CFPB autonomy in its policymaking,
rulemaking and enforcement functions and by giving CFPB an
assured source of funding from the Fed.
The financial services industry and most Republican
members of Congress vehemently opposed CFPB’s creation, and
they have sought to prevent CFPB from implementing its mandate
under Title X. In July 2011, the Republican-controlled House passed
legislation that would fundamentally change CFPB’s governance,
authority and funding. That legislation would seriously undermine
CFPB’s autonomy and effectiveness by (i) changing CFPB’s
leadership structure from a single Director to a five-member
commission, (ii) giving federal prudential regulators a greatly
enhanced veto power over CFPB’s rules, and (iii) requiring CFPB to
obtain congressional appropriations to fund its operations. Similarly,
Republican Senators declared that they would block confirmation of
any CFPB Director until the Senate approved legislation making the
308

Davidson, supra note 147 (noting that Representatives Spencer Bachus
(R-AL), Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), Ed Royce (R-CA) and other current
Republican House members supported legislation to establish a GSE
regulator whose funding would not be subject to congressional
appropriations).
309
Id.
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same three changes. Without a lawfully-appointed Director, there are
substantial doubts about CFPB’s ability to regulate nondepository
providers of financial services and to exercise many of the other
powers delegated to CFPB by Title X.
The financial services industry and Republican leaders have
justified their campaign against CFPB by claiming that the bureau
has unprecedented powers as well as a unique structure that is
unaccountable to the political branches. In fact, as shown above,
CFPB’s structure and powers closely resemble those of other federal
financial regulators, particularly FHFA and OCC. Major banks and
their legislative supporters strongly supported the creation of FHFA
in 2008 and emphasized FHFA’s need for sweeping powers and an
independent funding source that would not be subject to
congressional control. Similarly, large banks and Republican leaders
have consistently and vigorously defended OCC’s authority and
autonomy.
Moreover, CFPB is hardly an unaccountable agency. CFPB
must consult with a wide variety of outside parties before issuing
regulations. Congress has extensive powers to oversee CFPB’s
operations, and FSOC may review and set aside CFPB’s regulations.
Accordingly, it seems clear that the financial services industry and its
political allies oppose CFPB because of its statutory mission, not its
structure.
Large financial firms evidently fear that they cannot exercise
the same degree of political influence over CFPB that they have
successfully deployed in the past with regard to prudential regulators.
In the financial industry’s view, CFPB is likely to act independently
and conscientiously in carrying out its mandate to protect consumers
from predatory financial practices. Congress should want that result.
The financial crisis has shown convincingly that a systematic failure
to protect consumers will eventually threaten the stability of our
financial system as well as our general economy. Congress should
therefore preserve CFPB’s existing authority and autonomy despite
the determined attacks of the financial services industry and its
Republican allies.

